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1. The food supply chain is generally depicted as com-
posed by three main levels: agricultural production, in-
dustrial processing and wholesale or retail distribution. 
At a close look, the food supply chain becomes more 
complex than this tri-partition, involving a number of 
other stages and links that add value to the chain either 
in the form of goods or services inputs1. At each level of 
the supply chain, undertakings perform specific activities 
supplying goods or services. The food supply chain, as a 
1 On global value chains, see Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey and Timothy Sturgeon, 
‘The Governance of Global Value Chains’ (2005) 12 Review of International 
Political Economy 78.
ABSTRACT
This On-Topic revisits the complex issues rising in the food sector and its value 
chain. Both the European Union and the US competition authorities have 
scrutinized relationships between food chain actors. The increasing market 
concentration raises new challenges for competition enforcement authorities 
dealing with the creation of new powerful actors  at the distribution but also at 
the factor of production (input) levels. The concept of superior bargaining power 
has played a key role, sometimes criticised, in order to assess these relationships. 
The papers also discuss the critical intersection of competition law with public 
policy, with the aim to preserve sustainability, food safety and the stability 
of agricultural markets. 
Ce dossier revient sur la complexité du secteur alimentaire. Les relations entre 
les acteurs de la chaîne alimentaire font l’objet d’une attention particulière de 
la part des autorités de concurrence aussi bien aux Etats-Unis qu’au sein 
de l’Union européenne. La concentration du marché soulève des difficultés 
nouvelles dans la mise en œuvre du droit de la concurrence en faisant apparaître 
de nouveaux rapports de force aussi bien au stade de la production que de 
la distribution. Le concept de pouvoir d’achat occupe une place centrale, parfois 
discutée. Dans ce secteur, le droit de la concurrence doit également faire face 
aux politiques publiques, désireuses d’assurer la viabilité, la sécurité et la stabilité 
d’un secteur au cœur des habitudes des consommateurs.
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2 Concurrences N° 1-2016 I On-Topic I Competition law and policy and the food value chain
whole, originates therefore even before farming2, with the 
factors of production market (e.g. seed providers) and 
ends with the final consumer. The agricultural commodi-
ties generally undergo a processing stage before being dis-
tributed. However, in some cases they are sold directly to 
consumers (direct chain) or through the sole mediation of 
the wholesale industry (short supply chain). The  length 
of the supply chain depends on how many passages the 
good undergoes before reaching the consumer.
2. The relations between the various segments of the food 
value chain are characterized by various governance ar-
rangements. Typically, the relationship between market 
actors spans from a spot market exchange to a full own-
ership integration, passing by a variety of contractual 
arrangements3. Empirical studies on agro-related busi-
nesses indicate that contracts (and networks), instead 
of markets, constitute the most prevalent mechanism of 
governance observed in this sector.4 These sophisticated 
contractual networks operate as private governance re-
gimes, establishing usually long-term relations between 
the various market actors so as to address the multiple 
sources of risks in food production and distribution, in-
cluding events related to climate and weather conditions, 
animal diseases, changes in agriculture commodities pric-
es, changes in fertilizer and other input prices, financial 
uncertainties to policy and various regulatory risks5. One 
should also note the considerable amount of M&A ac-
tivity, as well as other forms of long-term cooperation 
between the various segments of the food value chain, 
but also between undertakings situated at the same level 
of the value chain (e.g. buying alliances, cross-licensing 
agreements between seed platforms, agricultural cooper-
atives). This consolidation raises important public policy 
issues, beyond competition law and policy. The existence 
of various market actors (at the wholesale, retail or other 
level), global retail chains, different forms of commerce 
competing with each other (modern and more tradition-
al), different means of self-regulation including standard 
setting and certification, various groups of consumers, 
various forms of suppliers (e.g. industrial, farmers), pres-
ents a complex web of societal relations built in order to 
guarantee the distribution of food, which because of the 
societal importance of the sector is intrinsically linked 
with politics, either at the national (democracy, political 
stability) or the global level (the new geopolitics of food).
2 The agricultural sector comprises both crop production and the raising of 
livestocÔ.
3  J Ìichael Harris and others, ‘The ĮS Ğood ÌarÔeting SystemÈ Competition, 
Coordination, and Technological Innovations Into the 21st Century’ L2002Ľ 
ĮSGĖ Economic Research Service 1.
4  See, James ÌacGonald et al, Contracts, ÌarÔets, and PricesÈ OrganiŖing the 
Production and Įse of Ėgricultural Commodities, ĮSGĖ. Ėgriculture and 
Economic Report, Ío. 8Ċ7 (200Ç) (finding that traditional spot marÔets, though 
they still govern nearly Ď0 percent of the value of agricultural production, have 
difficulty providing accurate price signals for products geared to new consumer 
demands (such as produce raised and certified as organic or identityǼpreserved 
crops modified for special attributes).Ě and predicting a continuing shift to 
more eŔplicit forms of vertical coordination, through contracts and processor 
ownership, as a means to ensure more consistent product Øuantity and Øuality).
5 OECG, Ìanaging RisÔ in ĖgricultureǼ Ė Holistic Ėpproach (OECG, Paris, 
200E).
3. The food sector is not only of particular social 
importance but has also witnessed major developments in 
the way it is organised. For instance, development of new 
technologies has led to the emergence of a diverse group 
of players: biotech seed and chemical crop protection 
companies; equipment and fertilizers suppliers; as well 
as digital start-ups – all of which are seeking to develop 
an integrated offering of all-inclusive solutions for 
farmers enabling them to gradually set standards and 
build technological platforms of food production that 
will allow such providers to compete for the lion’s share 
of the market. A lot of competition authorities around 
the world have also focused on the retail sector and the 
development of platforms by multi-brand retailers having 
superior bargaining power vis-à-vis processors/suppliers 
and other intermediaries.
4. This special issue aims to disentangle the various 
dimensions of competition law and policy in the food 
value chain. The first three papers of this special issue 
(MacDonald, Carstensen, Moss) focus on the factors 
of production and agricultural markets, exploring in 
particular their consolidation, the interpretation of 
possible exemptions from the scope of antitrust law for 
agricultural cooperatives and the effects of such consol-
idation for consumers but also the development of 
competition in this economic sector. Although the authors 
explore these questions from the perspective of US law, 
one may draw useful insights for any other competition 
law regime as the issues raised are typically the same 
even if  the approaches followed are not always similar. 
The last paper in this special issue (Lianos & Lombardi) 
explores bargaining power at the distribution but also 
production levels. Although the concept of “bargaining 
power” has provided a powerful narrative for competition 
law’s intervention in this area, there have been consider-
able doubts and criticisms in the way this concept may be 
operationalised and the availability of other tools than 
competition law to deal with it. The special issue will 
be completed by a study, which will appear in the next 
issue of Concurrences (Concurrences 2-2016) exploring 
the intersection between competition law and IP rights in 
this area and focusing on the upper segment of the value 
chain that of the factors of production and in particular 
seed players, and their relations with the other segments 
of the value chain – i.e. farmers (Lianos, Katalevsky, 
Ivanov). Exloring this dimension is essential in view of 
the recent M&A activity in the seed market, in particular 
following the announcement in December 2015 of the 
merger between DuPont and Dow, the merged company 
then splitting spawning three independent publicly 
traded companies in agrichemicals, materials science and 
speciality products and the announcement in February 
2016 of the takeover of Syngenta by China National 
Chemical Corp (ChemChina).
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Concentration, contracting, 
and competition policy 
in U.S. agribusiness
James Ì. ÌacGonald*
macdonal@ers.usda.gov
Branch Chief, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
I. Introduction
1. Competition in agribusiness has been a recurring topic 
of policy debate and action over the last two decades. 
Widespread attention has been focused on mergers 
among competing firms in food processing, food retailing, 
agricultural input industries; Federal antitrust enforcers 
have opposed some, but chose not to oppose others. Over 
the same period, antitrust agencies have discovered and 
prosecuted several international price-fixing cartels in 
livestock feed ingredients, as well as local price-fixing 
cartels in the provision of milk to school districts.
2. Two agencies share primary responsibility for enforce-
ment of U.S. antitrust laws. The Antitrust Division of 
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has the power to 
file criminal suits leading to fines and jail terms (in price-
fixing cases), as well as civil actions forbidding future 
violations of the laws and requiring steps to remedy 
anticompetitive effects of past violations. An indepen-
dent regulatory agency, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), can file civil actions in antitrust cases, and also 
has responsibility for enforcement of other consumer 
protection statutes. The two agencies share responsibility 
for merger policy, sorting merger probes according to 
developed agency expertize in the relevant industries.
3. Two laws, the 1890 Sherman Act and the 1914 Clayton 
Act, provide the basis for most antitrust enforcement, 
which focuses on three broad areas: 1) multilateral hori-
zontal restrictions on competition, including price-fixing 
and mergers; 2) unilateral horizontal practices aimed at 
facilitating the exercise of market power or excluding 
competitors; and 3) vertical practices, unilateral or multi-
lateral, that do the same (Hovenkamp, 2005). Another 
law, the 1921 Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA), 
includes several sections that have been interpreted by 
Federal Courts as antitrust laws focused on unilateral 
horizontal practices and vertical practices. The  PSA 
applies to livestock industries and is enforced by an 
agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
the Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards Adminis-
tration (GIPSA).
4. GIPSA enforcement has become an issue in debates 
over competition in agribusiness, which feature a major 
focus on livestock. In debates leading up to the 2002 
farm bill, Congress considered proposals to limit the 
use of certain types of contracts in livestock produc-
tion, and after intense debate ultimately included compe-
tition provisions in a new livestock title in the 2008 farm 
bill, the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (the 
Act).6 One provision directed the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to establish more precise criteria for determining 
when an “undue or unreasonable preference or advantage” 
had occurred under the PSA; another specifically directed 
the Secretary to determine whether a common feature of 
contract extensions—requiring additional capital invest-
ments by contract hog or poultry growers—constituted a 
violation of the PSA.7
5.  GIPSA, the relevant enforcement agency, carried 
out a rule-making procedure in response to the 2008 
Act. The rule-making focused on certain practices used 
by meatpackers in procuring livestock, such as: inter-
packer sales of animals; sales brokers acting on behalf  
of multiple packers; offering marketing contracts to 
some but not all potential sellers; and requiring contract 
poultry and swine growers to invest in new capital as a 
condition of contract renewal. An initial proposed set 
of rules generated considerable controversy, and elicited 
Ď The farm bill, the primary agricultural and food policy tool of the federal 
government, is a large and comprehensive omnibus bill passed every 5 to Ď 
years, under different specific names, such as the Ėgricultural Ėct of 201Ç 
(the most recent). The farm bill’s primary focus is on the commodity and 
conservation programs administered by ĮSGĖ, but other sections cover such 
topics as agricultural research support, agricultural trade policies, nutrition 
programs, and rural development.
7 Į.S. antitrust laws commonly feature very broad and imprecise language, liÔe 
that in the PSĖ holding meatpacÔer actions that give meatpacÔers or livestocÔ 
sellers an “undue or unreasonable preference of advantageµ to be illegal, while 
leaving it to enforcement agencies and courts to provide specificity.
* The views eŔpressed herein are those of the author, and not necessarily those of 
the Į.S. Gepartment of Ėgriculture or the Economic Research Service. Ce
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over 60,000 comments (Greene, 2015). The agency then 
issued a narrower set of final rules, which have not been 
implemented as Congress has prohibited the expenditure 
of funds to enforce those rules.
6.  While the GIPSA rule-making was proceeding, the 
DOJ and USDA hosted a series of workshops on compe-
tition in the agricultural sector in 2010, attracting wide-
spread media attention and large crowds at five locations 
around the country. While DOJ has frequently organized 
expert workshops to provide guidance on particular 
topics in antitrust, these were different. Interest in them 
carried over from the political debates surrounding the 
competition proposals in 2002 and 2008 farm bills and 
the GIPSA rule-making, and the hearings engaged senior 
political appointees at USDA and DOJ.8 The Secretary of 
Agriculture and the Attorney General spoke at each and 
participated along with other DOJ and USDA leaders in 
panel discussions on competition, agricultural contracts, 
antitrust policy, and related topics with farmers, proces-
sors, elected officials, and academics.
7. Several common themes arose (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2012). Participants expressed concern with high 
levels of concentration in agricultural markets, and with 
merger enforcement by antitrust agencies. Critiques 
focused on features of the production contracts under 
which most swine and poultry are produced; alleged 
bid-rigging and market manipulation in other types of 
contracts and in cash markets; and pricing in markets for 
genetically engineered seeds and seed traits, where the 
traits often were still under patent protection.
8. I discuss the background for the issues raised above—
increasing concentration in agribusiness and important 
structural changes in agriculture—and then review 
the evidence regarding concentration, agricultural 
contracting, and the exercise of market power in the 
sector, while tying those findings to recent policy actions. 
I emphasize livestock, where most of the debate lies, 
but avoid discussing political details of the GIPSA rule-
making controversy (an excellent review can be found in 
Greene, 2015).
II. Concentration 
and structural change 
in U.S. agribusiness
9. U.S. agribusiness has undergone far-reaching change 
in the last 30 years. In general, processors, input and 
service suppliers, and commercial farmers have become 
fewer but much larger. Agricultural transactions are 
more likely to be carried out under contracts, which 
can be quite complex. These structural changes spurred 
8 ĮSGĖ’s participation followed from its responsibility for PSĖ enforcement as 
well as a long history of providing eŔpertise to GOJ and ĞTC in cases related to 
the food system.
productivity growth, but they also created winners and 
losers and altered the nature of competition in some 
markets.
Table 1: Four-Firm Concentration Ratios in Selected U.S. 
Agribusinesses
Four largest firms’ share of: Beginning year Ending year
Manufacturing shipments Year=1977 Year=2012
  Fluid milk processing 18 46
  Flour milling 33 50
  Wet corn milling 63 86
  Soybean processing 54 79
  Rice milling 51 47
  Cane sugar refining 63 95
  Beet sugar 67 78
Nitrogenous fertilizer 
manufacturing
34 69
Phosphatic fertilizer 
manufacturing
35 88
Pesticide manufacturing 44 57
Farm machinery 46 61
Year=1980 Year=2007
Railroad grain shipments 53 84
Seed shipments Year=2000 Year=2007
  Corn seed 60 72
  Cotton seed 95 95
  Soybean seed 51 55
Livestock procurement Year=1980 Year=2012
  Steer and heifer slaughter 36 85
  Hog slaughter 34 64
Year=1995 Year=2012
  Broiler processing 50 51
  Turkey processing 41 53
Sources: Manufacturing shipments: U.S. Census Bureau; Railroad grain: USDA, 
Agricultural Marketing Service. Study of Rural Transportation Issues. April, 2010; 
Seed shipments: provided courtesy of Professor Kyle  Stiegert, University of 
Wisconsin; Livestock procurement: USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and Stock-
yards Administration.
10. Table 1 provides summary data, for U.S. industries close 
to agriculture, on a widely used measure of industry concen-
tration, the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4), which is 
the share of industry shipments or procurement held by the 
four largest firms in the industry. CR4 has increased in 17 
of the 19 industries, mostly by substantial amounts, and 
now exceeds 70 in 9. In particular, CR4 in steer and heifer 
slaughter rose from 36 to 80 during the 1980s, and by 2012 
stood at 85, while hog CR4 nearly doubled, from 34 to 
64. Broiler and turkey processing, for which the measures 
only extend back to 1995, are moderately concentrated, 
and concentration has increased over time. Ce
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11. Many markets are local, and these national measures 
may substantially underestimate concentration in relevant 
procurement markets. It is not uncommon for livestock 
producers to face a monopsony, and quite common to 
have 2, 3, or 4 buyers. Producers of storable crops face 
more options, but producers of perishable crops often 
face one or few buyers at harvest.
12.  Farming has also changed: production has shifted 
to larger but fewer farms that frequently produce under 
contracts with agribusinesses rather than for cash 
markets.
13. The nature of farm consolidation can be obscured in 
U.S. farm statistics, which include many very small farms 
with little production. The largest 7% of farms (about 
155,000) account for 80% of production value, while 
980,000 farms have less than $5,000 in sales.9
14.  Because the distribution of farm sizes is highly 
skewed, common measures of average size are not very 
meaningful. I track farm consolidation with a midpoint 
measure—the size of farm at which half  of all crop 
acres (or animals) are on larger farms, and half  are on 
smaller.10 The midpoint for farms with cropland was 
1,234 acres of cropland in 2012, compared to 589 acres 
in 1982. This consolidation, persistent over time and 
covering almost all field, fruit, and vegetable crops, was 
driven by the development of mechanical, biological, and 
chemical technologies that allow a single farmer or farm 
family to manage more acres (MacDonald, Korb, and 
Hoppe, 2013).
Table 2: Structural Change in U.S. Livestock Production
Item 1987 2012
Midpoint farm sizes
Broilers (annual sales/removals) 300,000 680,000
Cattle feeding (annual sales/removals) 17,532 38,369
Hogs (annual sales/removals) 1,200 40,000
Milk cows (herd size) 80 900
Number of farms with
Contract broiler production 22,000 15,830
Cattle feeding 112,109 77,120
Hogs 243,398 63,246
Milk cows 202,068 64,098
Note: the midpoint is the size of farm at which half of all removals (or milk cows) 
are on larger farms, and half are on smaller.
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, 
Census of Agriculture.
E Į.S. statistics define a farm as any place with at least Â1,000 of agricultural sales 
in a year, or the animal and cropland assets to normally produce Â1,000 in sales. 
The definition, in place since 1E7Ç, is not adÓusted for inÁation, and defines more 
places as farms as commodity prices rise.
10 The midpoint is a median, of the distribution of animals or acres by farm siŖe, 
as distinct from the more commonly used median of the distribution of farms by 
farm siŖe.
15. Consolidation has been particularly pronounced in 
livestock sectors (table 2). The midpoint dairy farm had 
80 cows in 1987 but 900 by 2012, while the increase for 
hogs was even larger—from 1,200 head sold to 40,000. 
Hog production also became more specialized, moving 
from a model in which farms raised hogs from birth to 
marketing (called “farrow to finish”) to one with farms 
specializing in stages (birth, or farrowing, to wean; wean 
to feeder; feeder to finish). 
16. Fed cattle production also shifted to larger opera-
tions, from a midpoint of about 17,500 head sold in 1987 
to over 38,000 in 2012.11 Most (75,000 of 77,120) feedlots 
have capacities of fewer than 1,000 cattle, and are often 
sideline businesses for people with other farming activ-
ities or off-farm jobs. However, such “farmer-feed-
lots” account for just 11% of all cattle marketed while 
about 275  large feedlots, with capacities of 16,000 to 
100,000 head, marketed most (64%) fed cattle in 2012.12 
17. Almost all broiler production is carried out by growers 
under production contracts with one of 20 firms, called 
integrators, which own and operate processing plants, 
feed mills, and hatcheries. Production has steadily shifted 
to larger farms, and by 2012 the midpoint farm produced 
680,000 broilers, compared to 300,000 in 1987. 
18.  Structural change in agriculture—to larger farms, 
greater specialization in some cases, and greater 
reliance on contracts—has contributed to increased 
industry productivity and lower real costs of produc-
tion (MacDonald and McBride, 2009; McBride and 
Key, 2013). Particularly in livestock, it has also upended 
traditional ways of doing business and has forced many 
producers out of business. Over 25 years, the number of 
farms with milk cows or hogs fell by about 70%, while 
those with fed cattle or contracts for broiler production 
fell by 30% (table 2). While increased agribusiness concen-
tration created new antitrust issues regarding mergers and 
the potential use of contracts to facilitate the exercise of 
market power, the concurrent wave of structural change 
in agriculture created turmoil and antitrust complaints, 
but few grounds for antitrust enforcement actions. 
Contractual relationships 
in livestock production
19. The broiler and hog industries rely heavily on produc-
tion contracts between farmers and integrators. Under a 
production contract, an integrator provides a farmer with 
11 Cattle production is carried out in three stages. Calves are born and weaned 
on cowǼcalf operations (728,000 in 2012), which have not undergone maÓor 
consolidation. Jeaned calves then move to stocÔer operations which emphasiŖe 
the development of frame and muscle, usually on forageǼbased feeding systems. 
Ğinally, cattle move to feedlots where they are confined in pens and fattened for 
slaughter on grainǼbased diets.
12 The larger feedlots realiŖe advantages from scale economies in onǼsite feed 
milling and the ability to use fullǼtime nutritionists, veterinarians, and marÔeting 
specialists to purchase and adÓust rations, manage animal health, and acØuire and 
marÔet cattle. Ce
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feed, veterinary services, and young livestock (chicks or 
feeder pigs) and collects the mature animals at the end 
of a production cycle. The farmer provides housing, 
equipment, utilities, labor, and management.
20.  Farmers are paid a fee for services, rather than a 
price reflecting the animal’s market value. Hog farmers 
usually receive a fee per animal or per animal space, 
and may receive premiums or deductions tied to perfor-
mance, based on mortality and feed conversion. Fees in 
broiler contracts combine a base payment with signifi-
cant premiums or deductions tied to the grower’s perfor-
mance, which is measured relative to the average of other 
growers delivering birds to a processor during a partic-
ular week.
21. Production contracts reduce some risks that an inde-
pendent farmer would face, such as the risks of price 
fluctuations for feed or livestock. Relative performance 
contracts also shift some production risks (those that 
affect all growers in common, like weather- or disease-re-
lated risks) to integrators. However, production contracts 
introduce several new risks, related to the substan-
tial long-lived investments that growers must make in 
housing. Because contracts often are written for very 
short durations, farmers can face hold-up risks when 
contracts expire, if  integrators require new investments 
as a condition of contract extension. Growers also face 
placement risks if  they do not receive new flocks/herds 
on the schedule that they expected, as well as a “league 
composition” risk arising from the small groups that they 
are usually compared to; they can be disadvantaged if  
that group happens to feature some exceptional growers, 
and advantaged if  it does not, regardless of their own 
performance (Levy and Vukina, 2004).
22. Broiler integrators own processing facilities, and there 
are virtually no cash or contract sales of live broilers 
between production and processing stages. While some 
hog integrators and cattle feeders own processing plants, 
most hogs and cattle are sold to packers under marketing 
contracts (as is most milk). Marketing contracts typically 
specify a quantity or quantity range of animals to be 
delivered to packing plants over various intervals, and 
they specify a fixed price or a pricing formula linking 
deductions or premiums to quality attributes. Marketing 
contracts may be for short durations—a few months—
but some have terms of years. 
III. Concentration 
and market power: 
Research and policy
23.  The DOJ and the FTC promulgate merger guide-
lines to acquaint interested parties with the standards 
currently being applied in determining whether a merger 
would be challenged on antitrust grounds. The initial 
guidelines, in place from 1968 to 1982, placed heavy 
emphasis on market structure, by specifying the combi-
nations of market shares in mergers that would “ordi-
narily” lead to challenges (Kwoka, 2015).13 The emphasis 
on market structure as a sufficient indicator of market 
power reflected the thinking of economists and lawyers 
at the time, and still features prominently in media and 
political commentary.14 
24.  That issue—whether concentration is a sufficient 
indicator of the exercise of market power—received 
intense scrutiny in economic analyses in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Concentration does appear to be generally 
correlated with prices; the effects are quite large in some 
markets, indicating a considerable amount of market 
power, but small in many cases and nonexistent in some 
(Bresnahan, 1989; Schmalensee, 1989; Weiss, 1989). 
The findings for agricultural markets mirror the findings 
for the broader economy: concentration matters in 
general, but the precise effects on prices vary widely, and 
depend on a host of other factors. Some highly concen-
trated markets even appear to yield competitive outcomes 
(Sexton, 2013).
25.  In subsequent editions of the merger guidelines 
(most recently, 2010), the levels of concentration, and the 
merging firms’ market shares, that would likely to lead 
to challenges have been increased. The guidelines now 
place more weight on entry conditions, the sophistication 
of customers of the merged firms, efficiency gains from 
mergers, and other market attributes (U.S. Department 
of Justice and U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2010). 
In short, empirical evidence does not support the use of 
concentration as a sufficient indicator of market power, 
or even nearly so, and policy has followed suit.
26. The effects of concentration appear to be weak in 
livestock markets, some of which are highly concen-
trated. For example, one study focused on broilers, where 
production is vertically integrated with processing, and 
the relevant markets are local labor markets for contract 
growers (MacDonald and Key, 2012). The markets are 
often highly concentrated, with half  of contract growers 
reporting that they face just one or two integrators in their 
area. Concentration does matter: fees paid to growers are 
about 8% lower in markets with one integrator, and 4% 
lower in markets with two or three integrators, compared 
to markets with four or more. However, it is surprising 
that the effect is not larger, because growers have substan-
tial sunk costs in houses, and few alternatives if  inte-
grators reduce fees. Integrators do have to attract new 
growers, who have more options because they have not 
yet invested in houses, and those new grower options may 
limit the market power of integrators. 
13 Ğor eŔample, in an industry with CRÇ eŔceeding 7Ç, mergers between firms 
with marÔet shares of at least ÇÃ would ordinarily be challenged, while in less 
concentrated marÔets, an acØuisition of a firm with a marÔet share of at least ÇÃ 
by one with at least 10Ã would draw a challenge. Tighter thresholds applied 
where concentration had been rising.
14 “Sufficientµ implies that increases in concentration beyond some threshold 
could be eŔpected, with a high degree of confidence, to lead to price changes 
(increases for monopoly, decreases for monopsony), irrespective of other marÔet 
factors. Ce
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27. The effects of concentration in markets for contract 
broiler growers, while modest, is substantially greater 
than that found in markets for fed cattle and hogs, where 
detailed data are available because Congress allocated 
funds to support research on competition in those 
markets (see USDA, 1996b; and RTI International, 
2007). 
28. There have been many studies with these and with 
more aggregate data (Sexton, 2013). Some find no statis-
tically significant relationship between concentration and 
prices, or no significant deviation of prices from those 
that would be predicted under perfect competition. 
More find some degree of market power—again either 
as a statistically significant association between price and 
concentration or gap between the observed price and the 
competitive price. However, those analyses uniformly 
find the gaps to be rather small, with prices of 1-5% 
below competitive markets. None found large departures 
from competition in cattle and hog markets, despite high 
levels of concentration.
29. Policy actions reflected the research findings. During 
the USDA/DOJ hearings, some commentators took the 
DOJ to task for not opposing meatpacking mergers in the 
1980s that, it was argued, led to high concentration and 
that would have been opposed under the 1968 guidelines. 
For example, the 2nd largest packer (Cargill) acquired the 
3rd largest (Spencer Beef) in 1985, when CR4 was 52, and 
Cargill and Spencer had market shares of 14.1 and 6.3%, 
respectively.15
30. Although meatpacking CR4 rose during the 1980s 
amid a series of mergers, one should not assume 
that mergers were the major cause of consolidation. 
MacDonald and Ollinger (2005) show that the four 
largest packers owned the same number of plants when 
CR4 was 80 as when it was 36; the plants were simply 
much larger. CR4 increased largely because some packers 
expanded the plants that they owned and acquired, and 
realized scale economies from doing so, while high-
er-cost small firms and plants closed, and closed precisely 
because the industry remained competitive, with revenues 
just covering costs. 
31.  In 2008, the DOJ successfully opposed a proposed 
merger between the third- and fourth-largest packers 
(JBS/Swift and National Beef). Even though pricing 
appeared to be competitive at a CR4 in excess of 80, 
the merger would have reduced the number of compet-
itors from 4 to 3 in some regional markets, from 3 to 2 
in others, and to 1 in one market. The action, focused 
on a merger between important competitors in a highly 
concentrated market, with an emphasis on the 3 to 2 and 
2 to 1 markets, reflected empirical findings emphasizing 
the potential price impacts of going to a very few buyers. 
15 Ìonfort, the fifthǼlargest pacÔer, sued to stop the merger on grounds that the 
combined firm would drive cattle prices up and beef prices down, harming 
Ìonfort. The case (Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.) went to the Į.S. 
Supreme Court, which overturned lower court rulings in favor of Ìonfort as part 
of a broad shift of antitrust away from earlier policy. 
32. While merger policy has adjusted in the light of new 
empirical evidence, policy is not fully consistent with the 
current evidence on concentration and pricing. In an 
important recent book, Kwoka (2015) argues that actual 
merger policy is considerably more tolerant of horizontal 
mergers in concentrated industries than the guidelines 
would imply, and that borderline mergers that have not 
been opposed have led to price increases. While there is 
broad empirical and expert support for the shifts from 
the 1968 guidelines, Kwoka’s (2015) evidence indicates 
that current enforcement is too tolerant at the margin, 
a finding that’s quite relevant for agribusiness sectors 
that are already highly concentrated and in the border-
line zone.
IV. Contracts, 
market power, and 
competition policy
33.  Most cattle are sold by feedlots to packers under 
marketing contracts, while some are still sold in cash 
markets. Most poultry and some hogs are raised by 
farmers directly for processors under production 
contracts. Most hogs are raised by farmers for integra-
tors under production contracts, and sold by those inte-
grators to packers under marketing contracts, while a 
small number of hogs are still raised by farmers and sold 
directly to packers in cash markets. 
34. Contracts limit certain price risks, to the benefit of 
most contract growers (Knoeber and Thurman, 1995). 
Contracts also clearly facilitate more consistent flows 
of more uniform animals to processing plants, thus 
reducing processing costs and increasing the derived 
demand for livestock (to farmers’ benefit). They are used 
to elicit more animals with attributes that consumers 
want, by tying price premiums to livestock attributes and 
by imposing certain standards into production processes 
(see the GIPSA-sponsored studies in RTI International, 
2007). The efficiency-enhancing attributes of agricultural 
contracts are well-known, with considerable empirical 
support, and have been an integral element of structural 
change. 
35. Marketing contracts can be designed to facilitate the 
exercise of market power by packers and integrators (Xi 
and Sexton, 2004). For example, contract commitments 
to only bid in whole-dollar amounts, or to tie contract 
base prices to the highest cash market prices paid in a 
period, can commit a firm to refrain from aggressive 
pricing in cash markets while also signaling that commit-
ment to rivals. Processors could also use production 
contracts to deter new entry in an area. However, there is 
little evidence on the prevalence of those specific contract 
attributes, and litigation has focused on other features of 
contracts with weaker theoretical links to the exercise 
of market power.
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36.  Some contract attributes may impose damages on 
contract growers and lead to litigation and regulatory 
initiatives. For example, production contracts often 
cover very short durations, committing an integrator 
to a commitment of less than a year while requiring a 
farmer to invest in the long-lived assets of land prepa-
ration, houses, and equipment (MacDonald, 2014). 
Integrators frequently require additional capital invest-
ments, not known to the grower at the initial investment, 
as a condition of contract renewal. Further, produc-
tion contracts frequently specify no animal placement or 
quantity commitment by an integrator, leaving the grower 
at risk from reduced integrator production. Contracts 
may introduce other poorly understood risks and, in the 
case of relative performance contracts, have compen-
sation formulas that are quite difficult for growers to 
understand. Some litigation that has occurred under the 
PSA has focused on allegations of deceptive and unfair 
practices in contracting, like allegations of improper 
weighing of animals by integrators (reducing contract 
fees), and on claims that packers can manage the flow of 
contract cattle so as to reduce prices paid in cash markets, 
thereby damaging cash market producers. 
37. In each example, contract designs might allow inte-
grators or processors to impose damages on contract 
growers, by appropriating economic rents that would 
otherwise go to growers. This presents a regulatory 
challenge for the GIPSA rule-making effort, quite apart 
from the political issues noted in Greene (2015). U.S. 
courts have consistently interpreted key sections of the 
Packers and Stockyards Act as antitrust statutes, and 
have therefore required evidence of harm to competition 
from alleged violations of the Act (Hovenkamp, 2011). 
Harm to competition is usually defined according to a 
market power standard—the exercise of monopoly or 
monopsony power by limiting market output so as to 
raise prices to consumers or reduce prices to growers. As 
a result, parties in litigation focus on evidence of compet-
itive harm, which is costly to provide and often weak 
when provided, while devoting little attention to the facts 
of contract designs, incentives, and effects. 
V. Conclusion
38. Structural upheavals have led to more concentrated 
markets for U.S. agricultural products and services, 
particularly for livestock products and services, with 
fewer but larger players in both agriculture and agribusi-
ness. Markets remain competitive in most instances—
even in spite of high concentration—while structural 
change has led to the realization of scale economies and 
improved efficiencies. Individual producers embedded in 
supply chains do face the potential for risks and damages 
that they did not recognize when they entered into agri-
cultural contracts, but antitrust litigation may not be an 
effective tool for handling contractual claims. n
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Consolidation in agriculture 
and food: Challenges for 
competition enforcement
Giana I. Ìoss*
dmoss@antitrustinstitute.org
President, American Antitrust Institute, Washington DC 
I. Introduction
1. The agriculture and food industries in the U.S. and 
elsewhere have been the subjects of intense merger 
activity over the last two decades. This shows little signs 
of abating, as excess cash and currently low interest rates, 
the influence of activist investors, elusive cost and coor-
dination synergies, and the quest for market power drive 
further consolidation proposals. The U.S. Department 
of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
which share competition enforcement responsibility for 
agriculture and food, have presided over a fundamental 
restructuring of these critical industries in the U.S. 
2.  The complexity of market power in the agricul-
ture and food supply chains takes a number of forms, 
from noncompetitive prices or contract terms, exclu-
sionary conduct, barriers to entry, to control of intel-
lectual property. Changes in the competitive landscape 
of U.S. agriculture and food industries raise two major 
issues that are particularly problematic for competition 
enforcement. 
3.  One is increasingly concentrated agricultural input 
markets such as biotechnology (e.g., genetic traits for 
herbicide-tolerance and insect resistance), transgenic 
crop seeds (e.g., corn, soybeans, cotton), chemicals 
(e.g., herbicides and insecticides), and fertilizer. The few 
players in these markets exert significant seller market 
power over growers. Recent proposed mergers involving 
agricultural inputs (e.g., Dow-DuPont) would further 
limit competition in the individual markets for traits, 
seeds, and chemicals, but also hasten the growth of large, 
integrated traits-seeds-chemicals “systems” that limit 
access by rivals and raise entry barriers.
4. A second concern is increasing consolidation in the 
mid- to downstream segments of the food supply chain 
such as food processing, manufacturing, and retailing. 
Motivated in part by the quest for greater bargaining 
power vis-à-vis powerful firms in adjacent and nearby 
markets, consolidation has resulted in a few, often verti-
cally integrated, competitors at each level that exert signif-
icant buyer power over growers of crops and animals. 
5. A major effect of consolidation in agriculture and food 
is that growers are increasingly “squeezed” by powerful 
buyers that drive down prices for crops and animals, at 
the same time they pay higher prices for critical agri-
cultural inputs. At the other end of the supply chain, 
consumers are adversely affected through higher prices, 
lower quality, and less choice for essential commodities. 
These issues pose traditional antitrust concerns involving 
prices, output, quality, and innovation. But they also 
raise new and troubling concerns over the viability, 
safety, and stability of the food system, thus highlighting 
the critical intersection between competition and public 
policy involving agriculture and food. To the extent 
these issues are observed in other countries, the lessons 
for competition enforcement and policy are likely to be 
similar. This article describes these issues and discusses 
their implications for competition, growers, consumers, 
and the food supply chain more generally. Moreover, it 
suggests ways that the “lens” of competition enforcement 
can be adjusted to account for them.
* Giana I. Ìoss has written and spoÔen widely on competition issues in 
agriculture and food. Ğor more information, see www.antitrustinstitute.org. Ce
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II. Market concentration 
in agricultural inputs 
and food processing, 
manufacturing, and 
retailing
6. U.S. merger enforcement in food and agriculture has 
largely failed to stop the march toward higher and higher 
concentration. This gradual elimination of compe-
tition has resulted in just a handful of large rivals in 
each segment of the supply chain. The restructuring of 
the U.S. agriculture and food sector is symptomatic of 
broader trends toward consolidation in the U.S. over 
the last 20 years. The U.S. economy is only beginning to 
grapple with the ramifications of this swath of consolida-
tion, as recent “meta-analysis” of merger retrospectives 
across industries indicates that on average, prices have 
increased as a result of merger activity.16
7. Major agriculture and food deals over the last decade 
in the U.S. include: Monsanto-Delta and Pine Land 
(cotton biotechnology), ConAgra-Ralcorp (branded and 
private label foods), ConAgra-Horizon Milling (flour 
milling), Tyson-Hillshire and JBS-Cargill (pork), and a 
chain of retail grocery mergers, including Safeway-Alb-
ertsons. The FTC’s successful challenge of the merger of 
broadline food distributors Sysco and US Foods is a rare 
exception to this array of transactions that were allowed 
to proceed, largely unimpeded.17 Many of the large 
market players involved in merger activity are vertically 
integrated, including global players such as JBS, Cargill, 
ConAgra, Monsanto, Potash Corp., and others. 
8.  The foregoing emphasizes the unique structure of 
the food supply chain, namely the presence of a large 
number of relatively small growers of crops and animals 
and a massive base of consumers that possess little, if  
any, economic power. Farming and ranching is relatively 
unconcentrated for most commodities in the U.S. and 
across much of the globe. While growers face vigorous 
competition in their own markets, the input and output 
markets they buy from and sell into, respectively, are 
highly concentrated. Moreover, growers often deal with 
vertically integrated buyers of their commodities. A few 
examples illustrate the problem: 
–  Markets for potash and phosphate fertilizers are 
tight oligopolies. Three U.S. and Canadian firms 
1Ď J. ĦwoÔa, Ìergers, Ìerger Control, and RemediesÈ Ė Retrospective Ėnalysis of 
Į.S Policy (2015), Cambridge, ÌĖ. The ÌIT Press.
17 Ğederal Trade Commission, Ğollowing Sysco’s Ėbandonment of Proposed 
Ìerger with ĮS Ğoods, ĞTC Closes Case (July 1, 2015), available at 
httpsÈCCwww.ftc.govCnewsǼeventsCpressǼreleasesC2015C07CfollowingǼsyscosǼ
abandonmentǼproposedǼmergerǼusǼfoodsǼftcǼcloses. The agencies negotiated 
remedies in some cases, ranging from structured divestitures to behavioral 
conditions on postǼmerger conduct. 
account for the bulk of North American output, 
with concentration levels exceeding 3,000 HHI 
for phosphorus and 4,500 HHI for potash.18 
–  Concentration in agricultural biotechnology is 
extremely high. In 2009, the “Big 6” biotech-
nology firms (Monsanto, DuPont-Pioneer, 
Syngenta, Dow, Bayer, and BASF) held greater 
than 95% of trait acres for corn, soybeans, 
and cotton in the U.S., with Monsanto alone 
accounting for 90% of those acres.19 
–  In a 2012 report, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) noted that levels of global 
concentration, and increases in concentra-
tion, of key agricultural input markets were 
the highest in crop seed.20 In 2009, the global 
market share of the four largest firms in crop 
seed was 54%.21 In the late 2000s, the top four 
held 95% of the U.S. market for cottonseed, 
72% of the market for corn seed, and 55% of 
the soybean market.22 In 2009, the four-firm 
concentration ratio for agricultural chemicals 
was 53%.23
–  Fed-beef packing in the U.S. is controlled by 
three firms which accounted for 68% of the 
market in 2012, while the top four accounted 
for 81% of output.24 Likewise, the top three 
firms controlled about 54% of U.S. pork-
packing capacity, while the top four controlled 
62%.25 The top four broiler processing firms 
controlled about 54% of the market in 2012.26 
And in the milling of wheat flour, two firms 
account for over 55% of the U.S. market.27 
18 C. R. Taylor and G. I. Ìoss, The Road to ÌonopolyÈ The Case for Global 
Ėntitrust Enforcement, Ėmerican Ėntitrust Institute (201Ċ), at 15
1E G. I. Ìoss, Competition, Intellectual Property Rights, and Transgenic Seed, 
58 S.D. L. Rev. 5ÇĊ 201Ċ, at 5Ç8, citing Ħ. Ğuglie et al., Econ. Research Serv., 
ĮSGĖ, Rising Concentration in Ėgricultural Input Industries InÁuences Íew 
Ğarm Technologies, Ėmber Javes (Gec. Ċ, 2012), at Ç, available at httpÈCCwww.
ers.usda.govCmediaCEĎ0711Crisingconcentration.pdf. 
20 Ħ. Ğuglie et al., Econ. Research Serv., ĮSGĖ, Report Ío. 1Ċ0, Research 
Investments and ÌarÔet Structure in the Ğood, Processing, Ėgricultural Input, 
and Ęiofuels Industries Jorldwide, at vi (2011), available at httpÈCCwww.ers.
usda.govCpublicationsCerrǼeconomicǼresearchǼreportCerr1Ċ0.aspŔ.
21 Id.
22 Id.
2Ċ Id.
2Ç G. I. Ìoss and C. R. Taylor, Short Ends of the SticÔÈ The Plight of Growers 
and Consumers in Concentrated Ėgricultural Supply Chains, 201Ç Wis. L. Rev. 
ĊĊ7 201Ç, at Ċ5Ď, citing CÌE Group, Daily Livestock Report (Jan. 18, 201Ċ), 
available at httpÈCCwww.dailylivestocÔreport.comCdocumentsCdlrÃ2001Ǽ18Ǽ1Ċ.
pdf. The top three firms are Cargill, Tyson, and JĘS.
25 Steve Ìeyer, Slaughter ProÓects Jill Test PacÔer Capacities, ÍĖT’I HOG 
ĞĖRÌER (Ìay 15, 2012), httpÈCCnationalhogfarmer.comCmarÔetingCslaughterǼ
proÓectionswillǼtestǼpacÔerǼcapacities. The top three firms are Smithfield, Tyson 
Ğoods, and Swift. 
2Ď G. Thornton, Į.S. ChicÔen Companies Enter 201Ċ Jith Production Increases, 
Watt Poultry USA, Ìar. 201Ċ, at 12, 1Ċ, available at httpÈCCwww.wattagnet.comC
articlesC21852ǼtopǼpoultryǼcompaniesǼusǼchicÔenǼcompaniesǼenterǼ201ĊǼwithǼ
productionǼincreasesĒvĚpreview. The top four firms are Tyson Ğoods, Pilgrims 
Corp., Sanderson Ğarms, Inc., and Perdue Ğarms, Inc.
27 Grain Ä Ìilling Ėnnual 201Ċ, at EÇ (201Ċ). The top three firms are ConĖgra, 
Cargill, and Ėrcher Ganiels Ìidland. Ce
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12 Concurrences N° 1-2016 I On-Topic I Competition law and policy and the food value chain
–  In food manufacturing, single firms dominate 
food manufacturing in major food groups, with 
two to four companies holding a 75% to 95% 
market share in U.S. grocery stores for items 
such as baby formula, beer, and numerous 
other categories.28 About 54% of dollars spent 
on groceries in 2012 went to the top four 
grocery retailers with Wal-Mart holding over 
30% of the market.29
III. Concentration 
in agricultural 
biotechnology – 
Debunking the 
innovation myth 
9.  Transgenic seed has been genetically modified to 
produce plants that are tolerant to herbicides, resistant 
to insects, and to other conditions such as drought. While 
the initial positive effects of biotechnology on crop yields 
attracted much attention, the focus is now turning to 
growing concentration in the markets for genetic traits 
and crop seed for corn, soybeans, and cotton. Indeed, 
merger activity, as opposed to organic growth, has likely 
accounted for the major increases in market concen-
tration in traits and transgenic seed over the past two 
decades. From the late 1990s through the 2000s, for 
example, Monsanto acquired almost forty agricultural 
biotechnology firms and independent seed companies.30 
Monsanto recently proposed to acquire Syngenta, albeit 
unsuccessfully. Even more recently, Dow and DuPont 
have proposed joining forces. 
10. Further consolidation in the agricultural traits, seeds, 
and chemicals markets pose potentially grave concerns 
for competition, growers, and consumers. For example, 
the USDA noted in 2012 that agricultural input prices 
have risen faster than farm commodity prices.31 Crop 
seed (and fertilizer) prices were two categories that 
experienced particularly significant growth. The largest 
increase from 1990-2010 was in crop seed prices, which 
28 Ğood Ä Jater Jatch, Grocery GoliathsÈ How Ğood Ìonopolies Impact 
Consumers 7 (201Ċ), available at httpÈCCdocuments.foodandwaterwatch.orgCdocC 
GroceryŁGoliathsŁ12Ǽ1EǼ1Ċ.pdf. PepsiCo, Íestle, General Ìills, Ħraft Ğoods, 
and ConĖgra are dominant in a variety of food areas.
2E G. GerlocÔ, Jhat Goes Jalmart Have To Go Jith ConĖgra’s Ìove Into Store 
Ęrand ĞoodĒ Net Neb. (Ėpr. 10, 201Ċ), httpÈCCnetnebrasÔa.orgCarticleCnewsC
whatǼdoesǼwalmartǼhaveǼdoǼconagrasǼmoveǼstoreǼbrandǼfood. 
Ċ0 G. I. Ìoss, Transgenic Seed PlatformsÈ Competition Ęetween a RocÔ and 
a Hard PlaceĒ Ėmerican Ėntitrust Institute (Oct. 2Ċ, 200E), citing C. Pray, 
J. Ğ. OemhÔe, and Ė. Íaseem, Innovation and Gynamic Efficiency in Plant 
ĘiotechnologyÈ Ėn Introduction to the Researchable Issues, 8 AgBioforum 52, 
at Ď0É and Įnited Íations Conference on Trade and Gevelopment, Trading 
the Trend Towards ÌarÔet ConcentrationÈ The Case of the Ėgricultural Input 
Industry, (Ėpril 200Ď), at 5 and EǼ10. 
31 Ğuglie et al., supra note 5.
more than doubled relative to the prices growers received 
for their agricultural commodities.32 Increasing levels of 
concentration in traits, seeds, and chemicals raise two 
major issues that bear directly on adverse price effects 
and other problems.
11.  One issue is the prevalence of transgenic seeds 
containing “stacked” traits, which have become 
the industry standard in corn and cotton. Stacking 
addresses multiple issues, including the drive for higher 
yields from multiple modes of action (i.e., insect resis-
tance and herbicide tolerance) and refuge concerns or 
requirements that growers plant both conventional and 
non-transgenic seed to combat growing resistance of 
insects.33 New stacked trait profiles are enabled through 
“intra-firm” and “inter-firm” stacking. The former 
involves combinations of traits innovated by a single 
biotechnology firm, while the latter combines traits 
across multiple firms. Inter-firm stacking is facilitated 
by licensing agreements, including cross-licensing and 
out-licensing of patented genetic traits.34
12. The presence of a dominant firm (e.g., Monsanto) 
in the markets for genetic crop traits has raised barriers 
to entry and expansion by new or smaller biotechnology 
innovators. 2009 data on trait stacks show that 62% of 
total stacks were inter-firm combinations—50% of which 
contained Monsanto traits.35 The presence of a dominant 
Monsanto platform has driven the industry to stan-
dardize largely on a single system, making it more difficult 
for rival inter-firm stacks that do not contain Monsanto 
traits to gain a foothold.36 Inter-firm stacking involving 
a dominant firm’s technology platform is also limited by 
that firm’s intellectual property licensing policies. 
13.  Anemic competition in agricultural biotechnology 
-- coupled with any use of intellectual property to shape 
and limit competition -- can stifle innovation, raise 
prices for biotechnology, and reduce choice for growers. 
This  emphasizes the importance of promoting rivalry, 
not only to facilitate innovation more generally but also 
to ensure that there are multiple opportunities for collab-
orations that could result in commercializable inter-firm 
stacks. The imperative of such collaborations is evident in 
the 2013 decision by Monsanto and DuPont-Pioneer to 
settle a patent infringement case, not through damages, 
Ċ2 Id.
33 Ìoss, supra note Ç, at 55Ċ.
34 See, e.g., G. I. Ìoss, Competition and Transgenic Seed Systems, 5Ď Antitrust 
Bull. 81 2011 and Ìoss, supra note Ç.
Ċ5 Ìoss, supra note Ç, at 55Ç. Ċ8Ã of all stacÔs were intraǼfirm combinations. 
Ìonsanto traits appear in E1Ã of intraǼfirm stacÔs.
ĊĎ P. Carstensen, PostǼSale Restraints via Patent IicensingÈ Ė ´Seedcentricµ 
Perspective, 1Ď Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 105Ċ (200Ď). Ce
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Concurrences N° 1-2016 I On-Topic I Competition law and policy and the food value chain 13
but technology collaborations.37 Dow and Syngenta have 
reached agreements to cross-license corn traits and Dow 
entered into cross-licensing agreements with Bayer and 
Syngenta to develop stacked trait cotton varieties.38 
14. A second issue raised by consolidation in agricultural 
biotechnology is the relationship between concentra-
tion and innovation. Recent empirical research demon-
strates that increasing levels of concentration in agricul-
tural input markets (including crop seed) are no longer 
generally associated with higher levels of R&D or a 
permanent rise in R&D intensity.39 There is also evidence 
that growing concentration in the seed industry in the 
1990s correlates with a decrease in the quality of inno-
vation, including a fall in private research intensity, 
as measured by declining numbers of field trials and 
sponsorship of R&D. A key measure of the output of 
R&D has also declined over time. The number of trans-
genic research products deregulated by the USDA (and 
thus available for commercial use) has trended steadily 
downward since the mid-1990s, falling by about 80% 
between 1995 and 2008.40 Finally, some analysis indicates 
that the average quality of agricultural biotechnology 
patents declined over the period 1985 to 2000.41 
15. These observations are warning signs, on a number of 
fronts. First, innovation depends critically on the ability 
of biotechnology rivals to collaborate in pro-competi-
tive ways. Only competition will promote this outcome. 
Limited rivalry, in contrast, is likely to produce anti-
competitive collaborations that limit competition and 
raise entry barriers to new innovators. Second, further 
consolidation will hasten the quest to engineer integrated 
systems of traits, seeds, and chemicals. The presence 
of these large systems would limit access by rivals and 
raise entry barriers to smaller innovators. Further 
Ċ7 See, e.g., Íews Release, Syngenta, Gow ĖgroSciences Ėgree to Cross Iicense 
Corn Traits (Ėpr. 1, 200E), available at httpÈCCwww.syngenta.comCglobalC
corporateCenCnewsǼcenterCnewsǼreleasesCPagesCenǼ0E0Ç01.aspŔÉ Íews Release, 
Gow ĖgroSciences, Ęayer CropScience Sign Global Cotton Technology 
CrossǼIicensing Ėgreements (Ìay 20, 2010), available at httpÈCCnewsroom.
dowagro.comCpressǼreleaseCdowǼagrosciencesǼbayerǼcropscienceǼsignǼ
globalǼcottonǼtechnologyǼcrossǼlicensingǼagreeÉ Íews Release, Íew Gow 
ĖgroSciences Herbicide Tolerant Trait Technology Stays on Schedule (Ìar. 
0Ċ, 2010), available at httpÈCCnewsroom.dowagro.comCpressǼreleaseCnewǼdowǼ
agrosciencesǼherbicideǼtolerantǼtraitǼtechnologyǼstaysǼscheduleÉ Íews Release, 
Syngenta, Gow ĖgroSciences Sign Cotton Technology Iicensing Ėgreements 
(Jan. 5, 2010), available at httpÈCCnewsroom.dowagro.comCpressǼreleaseC2010C
syngentaǼdowǼagrosciencesǼsignǼcottonǼtechnologyǼlicensingǼagreements. 
Gow also entered into agreements with GuPontǼPioneer and with Ìonsanto 
to develop soybean technologies. See Íews Release, Ìonsanto and Gow 
ĖgroSciences Reach Íew Iicensing Ėgreement on Roundup Ready 2 KieldĔ 
Soybean Technology (June 2, 2010), available at httpÈCCnews.monsanto.
comCpressǼreleaseCmonsantoǼandǼdowǼagrosciencesǼreachǼnewǼlicensingǼ
agreementǼroundupǼreadyǼ2ǼyieldǼsoyb.
Ċ8 Íews Release, GuPont and Ìonsanto Reach Technology Iicensing Ėgreements 
on ÍeŔtǼGeneration Soybean Technologies (Ìar. 2Ď, 201Ċ), available at 
httpÈCCinvestors.dupont.comCinvestorǼrelationsCinvestorǼnewsCinvestorǼ
newsǼdetailsC201ĊCGuPontǼandǼÌonsantoǼReachǼTechnologyǼIicensingǼ
ĖgreementsǼonǼÍeŔtǼGenerationǼSoybeanǼTechnologiesCdefault.aspŔ.
ĊE Ğuglie, supra note 5.
Ç0 See G. E. Schimmelpfennig, C. E. Pray and Ì. Ğ. Ęrennan, The Impact of Seed 
Industry Concentration on InnovationÈ Ė Study of ĮS Ęiotech ÌarÔet Ieaders, 
Ċ0 Agric. Econ. 157 (200Ç).
41 Ïuality is measured by the average number of patent citations per patent 
observed in research worÔ. See S. Ęuccola and K. Ĵia, The Rate of Progress in 
Ėgricultural Ęiotechnology, 2Ď Rev. Agric. Econ. Ċ,7 (200Ç)
consolidation among the large players in agricultural 
inputs would move the industry in this direction, further 
reducing innovation, raising prices for biotechnology, 
and squeezing growers.
16.  Finally, R&D-based efficiency justifications for 
biotechnology mergers appear to have “run their course.” 
Accumulating evidence points in the other direction, 
namely that high levels of concentration are not 
necessary to fund R&D successful programs. Competi-
tion enforcers thus face the difficult task of unpacking 
biotechnology firm’s efficiencies claims that only further 
consolidation will promote innovation. If  such claims are 
debunked, the anticompetitive effects of further mergers 
will be particularly pronounced.
IV. “Reactive 
consolidation”—
Competition law 
meets food policy
17. Over a decade ago, the USDA characterized consol-
idation at the processing, wholesale, and retail levels as 
“unabated and unprecedented.”42 Over 80% of total agri-
cultural and food transactions reported under the U.S. 
Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification program from 
2003-2012 involve processing and food manufactur-
ing.43 Statutory antitrust exemptions and immunities in 
the U.S. for certain types of organizations such as agri-
cultural cooperatives (Capper-Volstead Act) and export 
associations (Webb-Pomerene Act) have not aided in 
restraining the accretion and exercise of market power by 
large, vertically integrated firms.
18. Consolidation has been credited largely with enhancing 
seller market power. This is antiquated thinking, partic-
ularly in agriculture and food, where it has also strongly 
created and reinforced buyer power, particularly at the 
processing, manufacturing, and retailing levels where 
firms are simultaneously buyers and sellers in a market. 
19.  Mergers at the mid- and downstream levels of 
the U.S. food supply chain have been motivated in part 
by the quest for greater bargaining power by processors, 
manufacturers, and retailers to counteract bargaining 
power in adjacent or nearby markets. This dynamic 
triggers what can be called “reactive” consolidation along 
the supply chain, ultimately resulting in levels with fewer, 
Ç2 Ìoss and Taylor, supra note E, at Ċ5Ď, citing J. R. Gunn et al., ĮSGĖ, 
Ėgricultural Cooperatives in the 21st Century Ċ (2002), available at httpÈCCwww.
rurdev.usda.govCrbsCpubCcirǼĎ0.pdf.
43 Ìoss and Taylor, supra note E, at Ċ57, citing Ėnnual Competition Reports, Ğed. 
Trade Commission, httpsÈCCwww.ftc.govCpolicyCreportsCpolicyǼreportsCannualǼ
competitionǼreports (containing linÔs to the reports covering the years from 
1E77 to 2012). Ce
 d
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14 Concurrences N° 1-2016 I On-Topic I Competition law and policy and the food value chain
larger buyers that effectively control terms of trade.44 
For example, Wal-Mart exerts significant buyer power 
over some of its suppliers, forcing down their prices 
and narrowing margins.45
 
Wal-Mart’s market power has 
arguably prompted mergers in markets upstream of retail 
grocery, ultimately reverberating up the supply chain and 
squeezing growers through lower prices and/or discrimi-
natory contact terms.46
20. These effects are a losing proposition for competition, 
growers, and consumers. Prices that are determined by 
bargaining between powerful buyers and sellers do not 
produce the benefits of vigorous competition. And incen-
tives for exclusionary conduct by large, vertically inte-
grated firms are a threat to innovation and market entry. 
While these are standard concerns in antitrust analysis, 
reactive consolidation raises the specter of potentially 
more damaging effects. Robust rivalry at each level 
promotes redundancy, diversity, and stability in the 
supply chain.47 These conditions are far more likely to 
promote not only price competition, but also non-price 
competition that leads to the quality, safety, and reli-
ability that is an essential for health and human safety. 
44 J. R. Gunn et al., Į.S. Gept of Ėgric., Ėgricultural Cooperatives in the 21st 
Century Ċ (2002), available at httpÈCCwww.rd.usda.govCfilesCpublicationsC
CIRǼĎ0.pdf.
Ç5 See, e.g., T. V. Riper, The Jalmart SØueeŖe, Forbes (Ėpr. 2Ç, 2007), httpÈCC
www.forbes.comC2007C0ÇC2ĊCwalmartǼsuppliersǼmarginsǼleadǼcŔŁtvrŁ0Ç2Ċ 
walmart.html.
ÇĎ httpÈCCwww.bloomberg.comCnewsCarticlesC2015Ǽ10Ǽ07C
monsantoǼsaysǼagricultureǼindustryǼconsolidationǼisǼinevitableǼ
Ç7 Vertical and horiŖontal integration in large agribusinesses raises Øuestions about 
the ability of managers to implement and monitor Øuality control programs 
that ensure safety and reliability of the food supply. The Į.S. Center for 
Gisease Control (CGC) reported that in 2012, ´data showed a lack of recent 
progress in reducing foodborne infections and highlightLedĽ the need for 
improved prevention.µ Statistics from 1EE to 2012 indicate upward trends in 
rates of certain types of foodborne infections. Jhether these trends related to 
consolidation³particularly at the processing level³should be further studied. 
See Ìoss and Taylor, supra note E, at Ċ5E.
21. Reactive consolidation in processing, manufacturing, 
and food retailing thus imperils a stable food supply 
chain. Such supply chains lack are less likely to withstand 
exogenous shocks such as input disruptions, shortages, 
contamination, animal and crop disease, bioterrorism, 
weather, and even political events. Antitrust enforcement 
approaches in the U.S. and most other countries do not 
account for these types of adverse effects. This potential 
harm deserves serious attention in analyzing the 
long-term competitive effects of mergers that result in 
markets with a small number of large players. 
22.  Among other possibilities, enforcers might give 
considerably more weight to non-price effects of mergers 
in the mid- to downstream segments of the food supply 
chain. Safety and reliability are essential quality issues. 
At a broader level, a public interest merger standard—
as opposed to a “no harm to competition” standard—
would bring into the calculus the types of supply chain 
issues raised here. n
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The mixed record of the 
Obama administration in 
food competition policy 
leaves many unresolved 
issues: “Talking the talk, 
but not walking the walk”
Peter C. Carstensen
pccarste@wisc.edu
Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School
1.  The Obama Administration for its first three years 
showed substantial interest in rethinking and reorienting 
competition policy as it related to the production of food. 
The primary players were the Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and the Antitrust Division of the Department 
of Justice (DOJ). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
which has primary responsibility with respect to oversight 
of grocery manufacturing and retailing, however, was not 
actively engaged in this policy and enforcement program. 
The results of this period largely took the form of initi-
ating (and sometimes adopting) policy positions rather 
than active enforcement.
2.  Starting in late 2011 with the dramatic cut back in 
efforts to create a set of rules to govern the purchases 
of livestock and poultry, both the USDA and the DOJ 
largely abandoned reform efforts and public enforcement 
of competition rules attenuated. Private litigation has, 
however, continued to exist and has resulted in some clar-
ification of competition policy especially as it relates to 
agricultural cooperatives that market farm commodities. 
Overall, a large number of important competition policy 
issues remain unresolved or have been resolved in ways 
that are unsatisfactory from the perspective of main-
taining and enhancing workably competitive markets in 
the food system. 
3.  The Obama Administration initially made some 
positive statements about competition policy in food 
and agriculture. There was an apparent recognition of 
the need for enhanced enforcement of competition law 
and of the need to use the USDA’s authority to improve 
the functioning of markets for agricultural commodities. 
The most visible aspect of this stance was a series of five 
workshops held around the country in 2010-2011 to listen 
to the concerns of farmers and ranchers with respect 
to the state of both input and output markets in agri-
culture.48 The DOJ and USDA jointly sponsored these 
events. Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack attended all of 
the Workshops and Attorney General Holder attended 
all but one. The conspicuous absence of the FTC, 
which shares antitrust authority in food and agriculture, 
suggests that agency cooperation to ensure competitive 
agriculture and food markets was lacking.
4. A subsequent report by the DOJ titled “Voices from the 
Workshops on Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement 
in our 21st Century Economy and Thoughts on the Way 
Forward” summarized competition concerns and stated 
that the workshops had enhanced its understanding 
of agricultural markets.49 The Workshops highlighted 
a number of issues. First, the marketing of livestock, 
both hogs and cattle, had substantially moved from 
direct market transactions to various forms of contrac-
tual commitments which caused concerns about access 
to meat packers by producers who lacked or were denied 
such commitments. In addition, there were questions 
about the competitive implications of those contracts. 
Ç8 Transcripts of these sessions and the Ėntitrust Givision’s summary can be 
found at httpÈCCwww.Óustice.govCatarCeventsCpublicǼworÔshopsǼagricultureǼandǼ
antitrustǼenforcementǼissuesǼourǼ21stǼcenturyǼeconomyǼ10. 
ÇE httpÈCCwww.Óustice.govCsitesCdefaultCfilesCatrClegacyC2012C05C1ĎC28Ċ2E1.pdf.
* I am a proponent of an active program for competition law and policy with 
respect to the food system. Ìy preferences will be evident in the teŔt. This 
paper draws on worÔ done with Professor Robert Taylor and PatricÔ Joodall on 
competition policy with respect to food and agriculture. Jose Castro (ĮJ Iaw 
’1Ď) has provided valuable research assistance. I, however, remain responsible 
for any errors of fact or interpretation. Ce
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Second, very similar and more serious concerns were 
expressed about poultry growing contracts. There is no 
cash market for commercial production of chickens or 
turkeys. Growers have only short-term contracts with 
the integrators who own the birds, provide the feed, 
and compensate the growers for their labor and facili-
ties. Third, the production of milk was another focus of 
concern. A single cooperative dominated the production 
side in many regions of the country. A number of dairy 
farmers had concerns about its operation and how the 
entire milk pricing system operated. Finally, there were 
concerns about the genetically modified seed markets. 
Monsanto with its “round-up ready” herbicide resistant 
genetics had come to dominate the market. It imposed 
a number of restraints on the uses that farmers could 
make of the seed that came from their plantings as well 
as imposing restraints on its licensees with respect to 
combining the Monsanto genetics with other genetic 
modifications. In addition to these four substantive topics 
there were recurring concerns expressed about increased 
concentration on the buying side of the market for all 
agricultural commodities and, related primarily to the 
dairy issues, there were concerns about how some farm 
marketing cooperatives were carrying out their responsi-
bilities to their members as well as how they were seeking 
to control production in some commodities.
5. These topics provide the basis for the remainder of 
this brief  summary. As noted at the outset, in the period 
from 2009 to 2011, the USDA and DOJ addressed some 
of these concerns and apparently investigated others. 
However, starting in late 2011 and continuing through 
to the present (January 2016), these efforts were either 
abandoned or diminished dramatically in their intensity. 
I. Clarification 
of the Packers 
and Stockyards 
Act: Addressing 
the concerns of 
livestock and poultry 
producers
6.  The Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA) prohibits 
discriminatory and unfair acts by meat packers and 
poultry integrators in the purchase of livestock and 
poultry.50 As such it is the primary statutory tool through 
which farmers can challenge unfair or discriminatory 
conduct by poultry integrators and meat packers. Those 
challenges increased substantially starting in the 1990s as 
50 See, 7 Į.S.C.  181 et seØ.
concentration increased and buyers moved dramatically 
to use of contracts for livestock. Commercial poultry 
production had moved exclusively to a contractual model 
decades earlier. Such contracts were very one-sided. 
Farmers were required to make substantial long-term 
investments in facilities, but usually had only flock to 
flock commitments from the integrator. Not surpris-
ingly, these conditions led to a number of lawsuits that 
attempted to invoke the PSA to seek relief.
7.  The problems in hogs and cattle were somewhat 
different. Prices were still based on an increasingly thin 
public market price for cash sales, but access to slaughter 
facilities were given first to contracted animals. As a result, 
both price and market access created serious concerns 
for those producing either cattle or hogs. Although less 
numerous, the resulting problems for a number of farmers 
lead to another group of law suits that relied on the PSA 
to challenge various contracting practices.
8. By 2010, several court of appeals decisions had effec-
tively gutted the PSA. Some decisions, based on a 
poorly informed analogy to the Sherman Act’s rule of 
reason,51 required that the plaintiff  establish that the 
specific conduct “harmed competition.”52 For individual 
producers such proof was impossible. Another decision 
held that so long as the buyer had any possible justifi-
cation for its discriminatory conduct, even if  there were 
less harmful alternatives, the conduct was lawful.53 While 
the USDA through the Civil Division of  the DOJ 
opposed the interpretation that harm to competition was 
an essential element of every case, it failed to employ its 
rule-making authority under the act to adopt rules which 
articulated this interpretation. Moreover, the USDA itself  
did not invoke its own enforcement authority which at 
least applied to livestock transactions.54 It should also be 
recognized that the courts did face a serious problem of 
defining, in the absence of USDA rules, what conduct was 
unfair or discriminatory such that it violated the act.55
9.  In 2009, the USDA initiated a process to revise the 
rules implementing the PSA and proposed a number of 
new rules that could have made a significant improvement 
51 The rule of reason’s inØuiry into competitive effect calls for a determination 
as to whether the type of conduct would cause harm to competition in the 
affected marÔet. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 25Ċ Ğ.Ċd ĊÇ (G.C. Cir. en 
banc, 2001). The relevant PSĖ provisions deal with vertical, buyerǼseller, 
relationships, and a more properly analogous to unfair practices rules. 
52 See, Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride, 5E1 Ğ.Ċd Ċ55 (5th Cir. en banc, 200E)É Terry 
v. Tyson Farms, Ď0Ç Ğ.Ċd 272 (Ďth Cir. 2010).
5Ċ Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Ç20 Ğ.Ċd 1272 (11th Cir., 2005).
5Ç The statutory language authoriŖing the ĮSGĖ to challenge conduct arguably 
does not include poultry production, but PSĖ administrative rules do apply. See, 
7 Į.S.C.  1E2, 20E, 210.
55 In the Wheeler, Terry, and Pickett cases, however, there would have been no 
great difficulty in defining the unfairness or discriminatory elements of the 
alleged conduct (in Wheeler it was terms given an insider that were allegedly 
significantly more favorable than those given to other growersÉ in Terry, 
the conduct included behavior that violated specific eŔisting PSĖ regulationsÉ 
and in Pickett, the conduct claim was that the plaintiffs were eŔcluded from the 
opportunity to have contracts for their livestocÔ and that the practices did not 
in fact serve any legitimate interest of the pacÔers). Ce
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in the operation of livestock and poultry markets.56 This 
initiative was in response to an earlier mandate from 
Congress.57 The proposed rules would have rejected the 
requirement of proof of harm to competition and defined 
a number of obligations for meat packers and poultry inte-
grators. These proposals were consistent with the issues 
raised at the Workshops. They generated a vast number of 
comments both favorable and unfavorable. Indeed, some 
of the proposed rules were vague and may have imposed 
unnecessary constraints on the buyers. However, the 
buyers and their allies among the large livestock feeders 
focused on a broader attack on the entire proposal.
10. Major food processors and some groups representing 
large producers lobbied Congress vigorously against this 
initiative. As a result, in 2011, the USDA abandoned most 
of the proposed rules intended to implement the PSA in 
the contemporary world of production contracts espe-
cially in beef and pork production.58 The federal budget 
bill for fiscal 2012, as a result of a compromise by the 
Obama Administration and its legislative allies, removed 
funding to continue the process of adopting and imple-
menting the new rules.59 Moreover, the USDA apparently 
has failed to initiate any enforcement proceedings under 
the existing rules despite a good deal of private litigation 
and complaints showing that farmers are in fact subject 
to unfair and unjustified discrimination. 
11.  In 2015, a federal district court in West Virginia 
rejected the “competitive effect” requirement as an 
element of a PSA claim by a poultry producer.60 The 
defendant in January 2016 asked the trial court for 
permission to seek interlocutory review.61 In the Court of 
Appeals. If  such review occurs and the ruling is upheld, 
this could restore some vitality to the PSA as a source of 
protection for poultry producers.
II. Merger guidelines 
and antitrust 
enforcement
12. In 2010, the DOJ and FTC undertook a revision of 
their joint horizontal merger guidelines. The revision 
expressly recognized the competitive risks posed by 
5Ď See, 75 Ğed. Reg. ÇÇ1ĎĊ (July 28, 2010).
57 Title ĴI of the Ğood, Conservation and Energy Ėct of 2008 (Ğarm Ęill) (Pub. 
I. 110Ǽ2ÇĎ).
58 The final rules are found at 7Ď Ğed. Reg. 7Ď87Ç (Ğriday, Gecember E, 2011). 
These rules relate to poultry production but even as to these rules, the ĮSGĖ is 
effectively barred from any enforcement efforts.
5E See, httpÈCCsustainableagriculture.netCblogCfyǼ2012ǼagǼappropriations, Title 
ĴI of the Ğood, Conservation and Energy Ėct of 2008 (Ğarm Ęill) (Pub. 
I. 110Ǽ2ÇĎ).
Ď0 M & M Poultry v. Pilgrim’s Pride, CĖ Ío. 2È15ǼcvǼĊ2, Goc. Ċ1, filed 10C2ĎC2015 
(Í.G. J.Va.), unpublished decision, copy on file with author.
Ď1  Ìotion,, filed 1C1ÇC1Ď on file with author.
mergers that created undue buyer power.62 This is very 
relevant to the issues raised by farmers and food proces-
sors concerning downstream buyer power. Several court 
decisions, not all involving food, had demonstrated that 
there were significant competitive effects from abuse of 
buyer power.63
13. Moreover, these cases showed that dangerous power 
could arise with smaller market shares than had been 
conventionally assumed to raise concerns. The new 
Guideline recognized that harm to competition could 
arise even if  the volume of goods purchased was not 
reduced and when there is no adverse effect in the down-
stream market.64
14.  The implementation of a merger policy that takes 
seriously buyer power issues has been less consistent. 
In the waning days of the Bush Administration, the DOJ 
sued the proposed merger of JBS Swift and National 
Beef, which would have reduced the number of major 
beef packers from four to three. The parties abandoned 
the merger in February of 2009 shortly after the Obama 
Administration took office. In May of 2011, the DOJ chal-
lenged the combination of two small chicken processors 
in Virginia because they were two of the three potential 
employers of farmers to raise chickens.65 The case settled 
quickly based on some conduct commitments that caused 
at least some observers to express concern.66 It also 
settled two other cases with partial divestiture involving 
fluid milk and sow buying.67 In 2014, however, the DOJ 
allowed the two largest flour millers to combine with only 
modest divestiture which in turn creates a greater risk of 
buyer power with respect to wheat producers and grain 
elevator operators.68 
15.  Despite the expanded focus of the Guidelines on 
buyer power, the FTC, which did not participate in the 
Workshops but oversees most types of grocery manu-
facturing and grocery retailing, has not exhibited any 
Ď2 HoriŖontal Ìerger Guidelines section 12 (´mergers of competing buyersµ) (2010), 
available at httpÈCCwww.Óustice.govCatrChoriŖontalǼmergerǼguidelinesǼ081E2010Á12.
ĎĊ See, e.g., Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, 2Ċ2 ĞĊd E7E (Eth Cir. 2000) (price 
manipulation of cheese caused decreased milÔ prices and dairy farmers had 
standing under state antitrust law to pursue damage claims)É Toys R Us v. FTC, 
221 ĞĊd E28 (7th Cir. 2000) (largest toy retailer unlawfully used its buyer power 
to coerce suppliers to refuse to deal with buyer’s competitors)É Todd v. Exxon, 
275 ĞĊd 1E1 (2nd Cir. 2001) (employers coordination of Óob descriptions can 
constitute an antitrust violation because of effect on wages).
ĎÇ “The Agencies do not view a short-run reduction in the quantity purchased as the 
only, or best, indicator of whether a merger enhances buyer market power. Nor 
do the Agencies evaluate the competitive effects of mergers between competing 
buyers strictly, or even primarily, on the basis of effects in the downstream 
markets in which the merging firms sell.” See, Guidelines, supra note 1Ç.
Ď5 United States v. George’s Foods, 5È11CV000ÇĊ (J.G.Va.) available at httpÈCC
www.Óustice.govCatrCcaseCusǼvǼgeorgesǼfoodsǼllcǼetǼal.
ĎĎ Id.É see Comments of G. Ęalto, P. Carstensen, available at httpÈCCwww.Óustice.
govCfileCÇE7Ċ71Cdownload.
Ď7 United States, See other cases cited È et al., Inc. and Co are not reported v. Dean 
Foods, c. a. Ío. 2È1OǼcvǼ0005E (JPS) (J.G. Jisc. 2011) available at httpÈCC
www.Óustice.govCatrCcaseCusǼetǼalǼvǼdeanǼfoodsǼcoÈ United States, et al. v. Tyson 
Foods, c.a. Ío. 1È1ÇǼcvǼ01Ç7Ç (G.G.C. 201Ç) available at httpÈCCwww.Óustice.
govCatrCcaseCusǼetǼalǼvǼtysonǼfoodsǼincǼandǼhillshireǼbrandsǼcompany.
Ď8 United States v. ConAgra Foods, Case Ío. 1È1ÇǼcvǼ0082ĊǼĦĘJ (G.G.C. 201Ç) 
available at httpÈCCwww.Óustice.govCatrCcaseCusǼvǼconagraǼfoodsǼincǼetǼal. Ce
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concern with the increased buyer power generated by 
grocery store or food processor mergers. Its model for 
grocery merger analysis focuses only on local retail 
markets. It did not litigate any grocery merger in this 
period. It did settle a number of cases by accepting dives-
titure of some stores in specific locations. As a result, 
especially after 2012, the supermarket industry experi-
enced a merger wave that has further concentrated the 
retail grocery market.69 In 2015, Albertsons and Safeway 
combined to form a supermarket chain with 2,230 stores 
in 34 states. The FTC, after some dithering, insisted on 
partial divestitures that purportedly would eliminate 
any potential harm to consumers. The complaint iden-
tified 130 local markets in which the merger was likely 
to have an adverse effect on competition in grocery 
retailing.70 So, the FTC fashioned a consent decree that 
requires divestitures in many of these local markets.71 
This involved over 140 stores sold to Haggen. But very 
shortly after the sale, Haggen had to close a number of 
the stores and itself  entered bankruptcy.72 Whether the 
cause of this debacle was Haggen’s inability to expand 
to the scale necessary to run such an operation as Albert-
sons has claimed or whether, as Haggen claims, Albert-
sons deliberately sabotaged the stores is irrelevant to the 
competition policy concern. By electing to resolve the 
manifest competitive risks to consumers by a settlement, 
the FTC failed to protect those consumers. It also created 
an even stronger buyer of groceries which in turn is likely 
to have adverse effects on upstream suppliers and ulti-
mately farmers. Illustrative of the FTC’s unwillingness 
to consider the adverse effects of such mergers on buyer 
power, the complaint in this case makes no reference to 
the substantial enhancement of buyer power that results 
from this kind of consolidation among major grocery 
retailers.
16. Although the FTC has not exhibited any concern with 
the increased buyer power generated by grocery store or 
food processor mergers, it did block the combination of 
Sysco and US Foods, the two largest institutional food 
distributors in the country.73 The FTC complaint did not 
advert to the buyer power of those firms or the fact that 
ĎE In 2012, ĘiǼIo purchased the Ď88Ǽstore JinnǼGiŔie chain in the South, Ęusiness 
Jire, Bi-Lo and Winn-Dixie complete merger, Ìarch 1Ċ, 2012 available at 
httpÈCCwww.businesswire.comCnewsChomeC20120Ċ12005ĎE0CenCĘIǼIOǼJinnǼ
GiŔieǼCompleteǼÌergerÉ the Ìidwest grocery chains Íash Ğinch and Spartan 
merged in 201Ċ, Ė. ĘelŖ, S. ĖleŔander, Íash Ğinch To Ęe Sold To Spartan 
Stores in Â1.ĊĘ Geal, Minneapolis Star-Tribune, July 2Ċ, 201ĊÉ in 201Ç, Ħroger 
purchased Harris Teeter, Associated Press, Iargest ĮS grocer Ħroger closes 
Harris Teeter buy, January 2E, 201ÇÉ in midǼ2015, Ėhold (Giant and Stop Ä 
Shop) and GelhaiŖe (Ğood Iion and Hanneford) announced a merger that would 
combine more than Ď,500 supermarÔets in the Įnited States, S. Strom, ĖholdǼ
GelhaiŖe Geal Jould Create One of Iargest Grocery Chains in Į.S., New York 
Times, June 2Ç, 2015.
70 In the Matter of Cerberus Institutional Partners V, available at httpsÈCCwww.ftc.
govCsystemCfilesCdocumentsCcasesC150127cereberuscmpt.pdf
71 Ė total of 1Ď8 stores in 1Ċ0 local marÔets were to be divested. See consent 
agreement, available at httpsÈCCwww.ftc.govCsystemCfilesCdocumentsCcasesC 
150127cereberusagreeorder.pdf. 
72 Complaint, Haggen Holdings v. Albertson’s, Case 1È15ǼcvǼ007Ď8ǼĮÍĖ (Sep. 1, 
2015) available at httpÈCCmedia2.haggen.com.sĊ.amaŖonaws.comCwebsiteCtempC 
HaggenŁĖlbertsonsǼTimestampedŁcopyŁofŁcomplaint.pdf.
7Ċ FTC v. Sysco, 2015³Ğ.Supp.Ċd³2015 JI ĊE585Ď8 (G.G.C. 2015) (granting 
preliminary inÓunction).
their combination would have significantly increased that 
power.74 Nevertheless, blocking that merger did in fact 
avoid a substantial increase in buyer power with respect 
to agricultural commodities and processed food. 
17. In sum, while the stated policy of the revised merger 
guidelines asserts a focus on mergers that create buyer 
power, the DOJ’s actual enforcement efforts have been 
modest at best and the FTC has, despite its earlier success 
in the Toys “R” Us case, failed so far to show any concern 
for buyer power in the food marketing system.
III. Cooperatives and 
dairy marketing
18.  In 2004, the Division had initiated a case chal-
lenging exclusionary strategies of a mushroom cooper-
ative.75 The  Capper-Volstead Act exempts farm coop-
eratives from antitrust law when marketing their 
members’ products.76 But the mushroom cooperative 
was acting to restrict production rather than coordi-
nating the marketing of the commodity. The case thus 
raised the issue of the limits of the Capper-Volstead 
immunity. At  the time of the Workshops, the then-As-
sistant Attorney General for Antitrust expressed some 
concerns about the competitive effects of the act and 
suggested that it might be useful to re-examine its terms 
and application.77 There is substantial evidence from 
private litigation or settlements involving a number of 
other cooperatives in fields such as mushrooms,78 dairy,79 
potatoes,80 and eggs81 that there are serious problems 
with the conduct of some cooperatives. But the DOJ 
has made no effort to challenge any cooperative’s supply 
suppressing practices during the Obama Administra-
tion. Indeed, neither Assistant Attorney General Varney, 
having first suggested some concerns, nor her successors 
have challenged the immunities conferred by that statute 
7Ç See complaint, available at httpsÈCCwww.ftc.govCsystemCfilesCdocumentsCcasesC 
150220syscousfcmplt.pdf. 
75 United States v. Eastern Mushroom Marketing Cooperative, (E.G. 
Pa. 2005) information available at httpÈCCwww.Óustice.govCatrCcaseC
usǼvǼeasternǼmushroomǼmarÔetingǼcooperativeǼinc.
7Ď 7 Į.S.C.  2E1Ǽ2E2
77 C. Ė. Varney, The CapperǼVolstead Ėct, Cooperatives, and Ėntitrust Immunity, 
The Antitrust Source, (Gec. 2010) available at httpÈCCwww.americanbar.
orgCcontentCdamCabaCpublishingCantitrustŁsourceCGec10ŁVarney12Ł21.
authchecÔdam.pdf
78 In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, Ď21 Ğ.Supp.2d 27Ç (E.G. 
Pa. 200E).
7E Allen v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. 7Ç8 Ğ.Supp.2d Ċ2Ċ (G. Vt. 2010)É In re 
Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litigation, 801 Ğ.Supp.2d 705 (E.G.Tenn. 2011)É 
In re: Fresh Dairy Products Antitrust Litigation, 85Ď Ğ.Supp.2d 1ĊÇÇ (Įnited 
States Judicial Panel on Ìultidistrict Iitigation, 2012) (Ìem) (declining to 
consolidate four cases all challenging output suppression in milÔ). 
80 In re Fresh and Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, 8ĊÇ Ğ. Supp.2d 11Ç2 (G. 
Idaho, 2011).
81 In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation, 2011 JI ÇEÇ58ĎÇ, (E.G.Pa. 
2011). Ce
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Concurrences N° 1-2016 I On-Topic I Competition law and policy and the food value chain 1E
apparently because of congressional pushback.82 As a 
result, the DOJ was not involved in the resolution of a 
number of claims involving cooperative conduct where 
an informed public interest perspective would have been 
very important. 
19.  Another recent private litigation has highlighted 
claims of exploitation of some members of the Ocean 
Spray cranberry cooperative as well as independent 
producers by other members of that cooperative who 
apparently control its decisions.83 Ocean Spray itself  
appears to have a monopsony or near monopsony 
dominance of cranberry production. In addition, all 
American cranberry growers are included in a “marketing 
order” under which the growers have authority to restrict 
the amount of production that can be sold.84 The 
Antitrust Division did notify the Department of Agri-
culture that a proposed agreement between the cranberry 
marketing order and independent Canadian producers to 
withhold a share of the total crop from the market would 
constitute an antitrust violation.85 As a result, the USDA 
rejected the proposed order. However, the USDA has 
continued to allow other orders to impose similar output 
restrictions.86 
20. The Supreme Court, however, has held that in the case 
of raisins such output controls involve a taking for which 
compensation must be paid.87 Output restricting orders 
are economically inefficient. They induce market partic-
ipants to overproduce as a way of increasing their share 
of the permitted market. The order system does have 
some utility in providing standards including grading of 
produce, but it requires a more focused oversight with 
attention of how orders can and do adversely affect both 
market access by producers and the consumer interest in 
an efficient food production system. 
21. The USDA has substantial authority to control unfair 
and anticompetitive practices associated with market 
orders under the AMAA.88 To date under a number of 
Administrations it has not made any significant use of 
this authority.89 Most milk production is subject to such 
orders, but the USDA has allowed the exclusion of dairy 
farmers who are not members of a dominant cooperative 
82 Ì. Heller, Ė Senator Opposes Change in Iaws, Watertown Daily Times, Ìay 
E, 2010 (Sen. Schumer of Íew KorÔ pushed bacÔ against any changes in the 
CapperǼVolstead Ėct), available at httpÈCCwww.watertowndailytimes.comCarticleC 
2010050ECÍEJS02CĊ050EEEĎÇ.
8Ċ Growers 1-7 v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 201Ç JI 17ĎÇ5ĊĊ (G. Ìass. 
201Ç) (complaint charged Ocean Spray with discriminating against some 
members and independent cranberry producers by marÔet price manipulation 
relying on its monopoly position in the cranberry marÔet).
8Ç See 7 Į.S.C.  Ď08b and other sections of title 7, and C.Ğ.R.  E2E (the current 
cranberry order).
85 ĮSGĖ Turns Gown ReØuest to Iimit Cranberry Production, Wisconsin Ag News 
Headlines, Ėugust 21, 201Ç, available at httpÈCCwww.wisconsinagconnection.comC 
storyǼstate.phpĒIdĚE8EÄyrĚ201Ç.
8Ď See, e.g., pie cherry order, 7 CĞR  EĊ0 et seØ.É raisin order, Id.  E8E et. seØ. 
87 Horne v. Department of Agriculture, ŁŁĮ.S.ŁŁŁ, 1Ċ5 S.Ct. 2Ç1E (2015).
88 See 7 Į.S.C.  Ď08c (7) (Ė). 
8E See R. H. Ğolsom, Ėntitrust Enforcement Įnder the Secretaries of Ėgriculture 
and Commerce, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1Ď2Ċ (1E80). 
or its affiliates from participation in the premiums that 
come from the sale of milk for use as fluid milk. Most 
dairy farms now are Grade A producers, i.e., their milk 
qualifies for fluid use. No rational justifies excluding any 
dairy farmer involuntarily from participation in the order 
premium.
22. Those premia may not be very significant in many 
orders because the great bulk of milk is sold for other 
uses. However, even then there can be and has been signif-
icant exclusion of producers because the dominant coop-
eratives have negotiated exclusive supply contracts even 
when they lack the production to fulfill those commit-
ments. Hence, they then often truck in milk from member 
producers from distant points with the order paying the 
cost of that trucking. Because the USDA has the power 
to oversee the order process, it should evaluate whether 
its authority extends to limiting or even prohibiting the 
use of full-supply contracts thus opening the market for 
milk to more competition. 
23. In addition, dominant dairy cooperatives often impose 
other burdens on all farmers in the order area as condi-
tions of access to the fluid milk premium and to buyers 
controlled by exclusive supply contracts. Those burdens 
include potentially biased and costly testing or weighing 
of the milk being supplied. There is evidence that DFA 
may have, on the one hand, imposed monopsony prices 
on dairy farmers in some regions while combining with 
a milk processor to raise milk prices to consumers.90 
Finally, the USDA’s process for setting the price of milk 
is subject to serious manipulation and distortion. Reports 
of the prices paid for cheese provide the nominal basis for 
the pricing of all uses of milk. But those prices in turn 
are almost entirely derivative from the prices generated 
on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s public market for 
cheese. That market is even thinner than the ones used 
to set base prices for beef and pork. There are a number 
of proposals for reforming the pricing of milk but so far 
there has been no progress in identifying a better base 
pricing mechanism.
IV. Seeds
24.  Control over genetically engineered seeds was yet 
another source of concern in Workshops. The control 
rests with a handful of global companies, primarily 
Monsanto. The law allows patenting the genes that are 
inserted into seeds. This in turn has given these companies 
the power to restrict access to plant genetics because any 
work with a plant having patented genetics constitutes 
practicing the patent and so is unlawful without express 
permission of the patent holder. Despite substantial 
investments of investigative resources, neither the DOJ 
nor the state antitrust authorities have challenged any of 
these restraints. It is likely that Monsanto has modified a 
E0 In re Southeastern Milk Antitrust Litigation, 7ĊE Ğ.Ċd 2Ď2 (Ďth Cir. 201Ç) 
(reinstating claims against a dominant milÔ processor and dairy cooperative that 
had conspired to raise wholesale milÔ prices even as the same defendants settled 
claims that they had underpaid farmers for milÔ). Ce
 d
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20 Concurrences N° 1-2016 I On-Topic I Competition law and policy and the food value chain
few of its restrictions in order to reduce the potential for 
government action. The fundamental legal problem has 
been that the courts generally had regarded the exercise 
of patent rights with respect to the patented product to 
be exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
25.  In 2013, the government won a major battle to 
restrict abuses of patents in the “pay for delay” Actavis 
case involving pharmaceuticals.91 Essentially that case 
held that antitrust law applied to the licensing agree-
ments involving patented goods even though patent 
law expressly authorizes such agreements. The antitrust 
standard is ambiguous, but requires that the licensing 
agreements be reasonable. 
26. Also in 2013, the government sided with Monsanto 
to expand the scope of Monsanto’s patent right on 
genetically modified seeds in the Bowman case.92 That 
case involved a farmer who purchased soybean seeds 
from a grain elevator. Other farmers had sold the grain 
to elevators as Monsanto had authorized them to, and 
the elevators had no duty to restrict the uses made by 
its buyers. The Supreme Court, however, determined that 
farmer Bowman had “infringed” the Monsanto patent 
just by planting the seed and required a license to grow 
the plant. Hence, one patented gene out of an estimated 
46,00093 gave Monsanto control over the entire plant. 
Anyone planting such a seed, even if  purchased from 
Monsanto, was infringing the patent unless Monsanto 
also licensed the buyer to plant the seed. However, the 
Court further observed that “Monsanto (…) could not 
realistically—preclude all planting. No sane farmer, after 
all, would buy the product without some ability to grow 
soybeans from it.”94 Further, the Court made clear that it 
would imply a license: “farmer[s] might reasonably claim 
that the sale came with an implied license.”95 Hence, by 
implication the Court acknowledged that Monsanto by 
making a sale of its seed had a duty to provide a “reason-
able license” to the farmer. This result is consistent with 
Actavis and suggests that the antitrust agencies can (and 
should) take a more active role in reviewing the merits of 
various restrictive practices that patent holders employ 
by the use of patent licensing.
27.  Unfortunately the exploitive and exclusionary 
licensing practices of major patent holders in the seed 
business have not yet received any effective challenge. 
Monsanto, the dominant firm, has used its licensing to 
restrict the ability of its licensees to “stack” patented 
genes from other sources on seeds containing Monsanto 
patented genes. Monsanto also withdrew its initial 
genetics before the patent expired and forced licensees 
to transfer to a newly patented version of the same 
genetics. This short-circuited the capacity of competitors 
E1 FTC v. Actavis, 570 Į.S. ŁŁŁ, 1ĊĊ S.Ct. 222Ċ (201Ċ).
E2 Bowman v. Monsanto, 5ĎE Į.S.ŁŁ, 1ĊĊ S. Ct. 17Ď1 (201Ċ).
EĊ See J. SchmutŖ et al., Genome SeØuence of The Palaeopolyploid Soybean, ÇĎĊ 
Nature 178 (1Ç January 2010).
EÇ Bowman v. Monsanto, 1ĊĊ S. Ct. at 17Ď8.
E5 Id. at 17Ď7, footnote Ċ. 
to develop generic substitutes for the patented version. 
Again, the antitrust authorities made no effort to 
challenge this practice and the associated refusal to allow 
licensees to use the patented genetics to develop generic 
replacements in the post patent period. This defeated 
the very goal of patenting which is to ensure that after 
the expiration of the patent the public can enjoy the 
benefits of the invention without a monopoly premium. 
Monsanto has also retained a policy of prohibiting 
farmers from saving seed with patented genes thereby 
forcing them to buy “new” seed each year whether the 
seed comes directly from Monsanto or from some other 
licensed seed producer. The ban on saving seed eliminates 
a source of price competition for new seed. While much 
of the markup in seed price reflects Monsanto license 
fees, another significant part comes from the fact that the 
seed sellers do not face any competition from saved seed. 
It is technically feasible for Monsanto to offer a separate 
license to save and replant seed.96 Not all farmers would 
choose to take such licenses, but some would and that in 
turn would pressure seed producers to lower the price of 
new seed. The Federal Circuit rejected earlier efforts to 
challenge this ban97 and no current litigation exists that 
would compel the circuit to revisit its decision in light of 
Actavis and Bowman. 
28. In sum, the market for commercial seeds remains, as it 
was eight years ago, highly concentrated and encrusted with 
anticompetitive practices that both entrench the existing 
market leaders and exploit the buyers of their seeds.
V. The continuing 
issues
29. The foregoing discussions highlight a number of areas 
needing continued attention. There ought to be better 
articulated rules to govern contracting for poultry and 
livestock. The pattern of misuse of the Capper-Volstead 
rights to suppress output at the expense of consumers and 
to exclude or exploit some producers should be the object 
of greater concern by both the DOJ and USDA. While 
it may be aspirational given the apparent political clout 
of Capper-Volstead’s advocates, a serious review of this 
exemption and how it operates is long overdue.98 A related 
concern is the anticompetitive use of marketing orders 
under the AMAA. There is a need for a critical review 
and modification of a number of these orders. Some cause 
anticompetitive harms in the guise of setting standards for 
quality or other elements of the marketing of commodi-
ties. Other orders impose restrictions on output or discrim-
inate among producers. Not all market regulation by 
orders are anticompetitive, but a focused review process is 
necessary to eliminate unreasonable regulations.
EĎ See, P. C. Carstensen, PostǼSale Restraints via Patent IicensingÈ Ė ´ Seedcentricµ 
Perspective, 1Ď Fordham Intel Prop. Media & Entertainment L. J. 105Ċ (200Ď).
E7 Monsanto v. Scruggs, Ç5E Ğ.Ċd 1Ċ28 (Ğed. Cir. 200Ď).
E8 See, e.g., P. C. Carstensen, Ėgricultural Cooperatives and the IawÈ Obsolete 
Statutes in a Gynamic Economy, 58 S. D. L. Rev. ÇĎ2 (201Ċ). Ce
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30.  Concerns about buyer power and its abuse are 
pervasive in agriculture and food. Specific areas of 
concern were discussed in connection with contracting for 
poultry and livestock as well as in merger policy generally. 
It is important that the scope of these problems be appre-
ciated as well as the intractable nature of remedying such 
abuses once the market structure makes them feasible. 
Producers of fish from fish farms and trees from tree 
farms are experiencing the same deprivations resulting 
from exploitation of buyer power as the poultry and 
livestock markets. Grocery stores and grocery manufac-
turers each have an increasing level of buyer power. Both 
levels ultimately result in burdens on the producers of 
farm products. The FTC in particular needs to acknowl-
edge the importance of buyer power risks in its assess-
ment of mergers in grocery retailing and manufacturing.
31.  Overall, the Obama Administration deserves some 
credit for recognizing that there are serious issues related 
to the competitiveness of the food system. Unfortunately, 
having recognized that these issues exist, it has done very 
little to remedy them. Going forward, there needs to be a 
greater willingness on the part of the DOJ, USDA, and 
FTC to “walk the walk” and not just “talk the talk.”  n
C
e 
do
cu
m
en
t e
st
 p
ro
té
gé
 a
u 
tit
re
 d
u 
dr
oi
t d
'a
ut
eu
r p
ar
 le
s 
co
nv
en
tio
ns
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
le
s 
en
 v
ig
ue
ur
 e
t l
e 
C
od
e 
de
 la
 p
ro
pr
ié
té
 in
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
 d
u 
1e
r j
ui
lle
t 1
99
2.
 T
ou
te
 u
til
is
at
io
n 
no
n 
au
to
ris
ée
 c
on
st
itu
e 
un
e 
co
nt
re
fa
ço
n,
 d
él
it 
pé
na
le
m
en
t s
an
ct
io
nn
é 
ju
sq
u'
à 
3 
an
s 
d'
em
pr
is
on
ne
m
en
t e
t 3
00
 0
00
 €
 d
'a
m
en
de
 (a
rt.
 
L.
 3
35
-2
 C
PI
). 
L’
ut
ili
sa
tio
n 
pe
rs
on
ne
lle
 e
st
 s
tri
ct
em
en
t a
ut
or
is
ée
 d
an
s 
le
s 
lim
ite
s 
de
 l’
ar
tic
le
 L
. 1
22
 5
 C
PI
 e
t d
es
 m
es
ur
es
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 d
e 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
po
uv
an
t a
cc
om
pa
gn
er
 c
e 
do
cu
m
en
t. 
Th
is
 d
oc
um
en
t i
s 
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
by
 c
op
yr
ig
ht
 la
w
s 
an
d 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
op
yr
ig
ht
 tr
ea
tie
s.
 N
on
-a
ut
ho
ris
ed
 u
se
 o
f t
hi
s 
do
cu
m
en
t 
co
ns
tit
ut
es
 a
 v
io
la
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
pu
bl
is
he
r's
 ri
gh
ts
 a
nd
 m
ay
 b
e 
pu
ni
sh
ed
 b
y 
up
 to
 3
 y
ea
rs
 im
pr
is
on
m
en
t a
nd
 u
p 
to
 a
 €
 3
00
 0
00
 fi
ne
 (A
rt.
 L
. 3
35
-2
 C
od
e 
de
 la
 P
ro
pr
ié
té
 In
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
). 
Pe
rs
on
al
 u
se
 o
f t
hi
s 
do
cu
m
en
t i
s 
au
th
or
is
ed
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
lim
its
 o
f A
rt.
 L
 1
22
-5
 C
od
e 
de
 la
 P
ro
pr
ié
té
 In
te
lle
ct
ue
lle
 a
nd
 D
R
M
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n.
22 Concurrences N° 1-2016 I On-Topic I Competition law and policy and the food value chain
Superior bargaining power 
and the global food value 
chain: The wuthering heights 
of holistic competition law?
Ioannis Lianos
i.lianos@ucl.ac.uk
Professor, Faculty of Laws, UCL, London 
Director, Centre for Law, Economics and Society at UCL 
Chief Researcher, Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development, HSE, Moscow 
Principal Investigator of the Multi-jurisdictional project “Competition law and policy and the global food value chain”
Claudio Iombardi
clombardi@hse.ru
Postdoctoral research fellow, Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development, HSE, Moscow
I. Introduction
1. The social and economic importance of the food sector 
has always put in the spotlight of competition author-
ities.99 As Chauve et al. remark “the food supply chain 
accounts for 5 per cent of E.U. value added and 7 per cent 
of employment, bringing together the agricultural sector, 
the food processing and manufacturing industry, wholesale 
trade, and the distribution sector,” also noting that the “[f]
ood spending represents about 15 per cent of the average 
EU household budget.”100 Two subsequent developments 
have ensured that food issues have recently gained prom-
inence in the work of competition authorities. First, the 
* Ìany thanÔs to Ğlorian Jagner von Papp for comments on an earlier draft of 
the paper and to Philipp HacÔer and Ganiel Slichting for eŔcellent research 
assistance. Ėny errors or omissions are of the sole responsibility of the authors. 
Ioannis Iianos acÔnowledges the support of the Ieverhulme Trust.
EE Ğor a description of antitrust decisions in the agribusiness sector in Europe, 
see P. Ęuccirossi, S. Ìarette and Ė. Schiavina, Competition policy and the 
agribusiness sector in the European Įnion, (2002 2E(Ċ) European Review of 
Agricultural Economics Ċ7ĊǼĊE7É ECÍ, Report on Competition Iaw Enforcement 
and ÌarÔet Ìonitoring Ėctivities by European Competition Ėuthorities in the 
Ğood Sector (2012), available at httpÈCCec.europa.euCcompetitionCecnCfoodŁ 
reportŁen.pdf, noting that in the period 200ÇǼ2012, European national antitrust 
authorities have brought in total 180 antitrust cases and 1,Ċ00 merger cases. 
To this, one may add the marÔet monitoring actions launched by the national 
antitrust authorities in the same period, which according to the report amount to 
102. Ė similar trend may be identified with regard to the competition authorities 
of emergent economies.
100 P. Chauve, Ė. Parera and Ė. RencÔens, Ėgriculture, Ğood and Competition 
IawÈ Ìoving the Ęorders, (201Ç) 5(5) Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice Ċ0ÇǼĊ1Ċ, Ċ0Ç. See also, I. ĘuÔeviciute, Ė. GierŔ and Ğ. IlŖÔovitŖ, The 
functioning of the food supply chain and its effect on food prices in the European 
Įnion, (200E) European Economy, Occasional Papers Ç7, ĎǼ8.
 
 
 
considerable rise of the price of commodities, including 
food, in 2008, led to increasing demands for intervention 
from public authorities in order to curb the phenomenon 
of food inflation.101 Food inflation trends seem, however, 
to have since been reversed, the prices of commodi-
ties decreasing sharply the last few months of 2015.102 
Second, additional concerns have been raised by the 
perception that retailers have gained considerable power 
over the upstream parts of the supply chain, in particular 
processors but also farmers. Individual or collective 
retailer power has been at the centre of the attention of 
 
 
101 It was reported that inÁation from 2005 to 2011 saw food prices increase 
by around 22Ã on average across OECG countries. However, there has been 
substantial variationÈ relatively low levels of food inÁation in the ĮS (1ÇÃ) 
through to higher levels in TurÔey (Ď7Ã) and ÌeŔico (Ç8Ã). These variations 
even occur within countries participating to more homogeneous (from a trade 
perspective) blocÔs (e.g. EĮ)È OECG, Competition in the Food Chain, vol. 
GĖĞCCOÌP(201Ċ)15 (OECG 201Ċ).
102 The ĞĖO Ğood Price IndeŔ averaged 155.7 points in Ėugust 2015, down 
8.5 points (5.2Ã) from July, the sharpest monthly drop since Gecember 2008È 
ĞĖO, Ğood Price IndeŔ, available at httpÈCCwww.fao.orgCworldfoodsituationC 
foodpricesindeŔCen. Ce
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public authorities in Europe,103 with certain investigations 
being recently carried out at the national level.104 As a 
recent study commissioned by the European Commis-
sion shows, the top  10 European retailers have seen 
their market share grow from 26% of total EU grocery 
in 2000 to almost 31% in 2011, the overall concentration 
of retailers increasing in virtually all Member States.105 
The international expansion of some retail brands across 
Europe, but also in non-European markets, has led to a 
general decrease in the importance of home markets for 
top European retailers in terms of the domestic share of 
European grocery banner sales.106 Retailer power also 
manifests itself  increasingly with the use of private labels, 
which compete directly with leading manufacturers’ 
brands and other national brands and illustrate this shift 
in the balance of power between retailers and suppliers.107
2. Concerns over the rising power of retailers in the food 
sector have led many competition authorities to use 
existing rules or adopt new rules on superior bargaining 
power, these rules either forming part of competition 
law statutes or of other functional equivalents.108 These 
different rules stay relatively opaque as to the definition 
of the concept of superior bargaining power, the common 
characteristic (and presumably) advantage of these provi-
sions being that they may potentially impose compe-
tition law related duties to undertakings not disposing 
of a dominant position or a significant market power, 
for unilateral conduct, which would have otherwise not 
been subject to competition law related duties under 
the traditional rules of abuse of a dominant position. 
The concept of superior (or unequal) bargaining power 
10Ċ See the study commissioned by the OĞTÈ P. Gobson, Ì. Jaterson and 
Ė. Chu, The Jelfare ConseØuences of the EŔercise of Ęuyer Power, OĞT, 
September 1EE8, Research Paper 1ĎÉ OECG, Ęuying Power of Ìultiproduct 
Retailers, 1EEEÉ European Commission, Ęuyer Power and its Impact in the 
Ğood Retail Gistribution Sector of the European Įnion, 1EEEÉ ĮĦ Competition 
Commission, SupermarÔetsÈ Ė report on the supply of groceries from multiple 
stores in the Įnited Ħingdom, 2000, Cm. Ç8Ç2.
10Ç ĮĦ Competition Commission, The supply of groceries in the ĮĦ marÔet 
investigation, Ėpril 2008É OĞT, Grocery ÌarÔet ² Proposed Gecision to 
ÌaÔe a ÌarÔet Investigation Reference, Ìarch 200Ď, at Ç2ǼÇEÉ Ė. Svetlicinii, 
The Croatian Competition Ėuthority issues a report on competition on the 
food retail marÔet in 2008, 1Ď July 200E, e-Competitions, Ío. 287ÇE, www.
concurrences.comÉ H. P. Íehl, The Ėustrian competition authority concludes 
general inØuiry in the highly concentrated food distribution sector while 
highlighting indications of strong buyer power (Branchenuntersuchung 
Lebensmittelhandel), 18 June 2007, e-Competitions, Ío. 1ĊE81, www.
concurrences.comÉ 
105 European Commission, GG COÌP, The Economic Impact of Ìodern Retail 
on Choice and Innovation in the EĮ Ğood Sector, (201Ç), available at httpÈCC
ec.europa.euCcompetitionCpublicationsCĦG021ÇE55EÍÍ.pdf, 50Ǽ52. This is 
driven by higher concentration of modern retail.
10Ď European Commission, GG COÌP, The Economic Impact of Ìodern Retail 
on Choice and Innovation in the EĮ Ğood Sector, (201Ç), available at httpÈCC
ec.europa.euCcompetitionCpublicationsCĦG021ÇE55EÍÍ.pdf, 55. 
107 G. R. Gesai, I. Iianos and S. Jeber Jaller, Ęrands, Competition Iaw and IP 
(CĮP, 2015)É Ė. EŖrachi and Į. ĘernitŖ, Private Iabels, Ęranded Goods and 
Competition PolicyÈ The Changing Iandscape of Retail Competition (OĮP 
200E)É Ė. EŖrachi, Įnchallenged ÌarÔet PowerĒ The Tale of SupermarÔets, 
Private Iabels, and Competition Iaw, (2010) ĊĊ(2) Jorld Competition 
257Ǽ27ÇÉ Ė. Ğoer, Introduction to Symposium on Ęuyer Power and Ėntitrust, 
72 Ėntitrust I.J. 505 (2005)É I. Vogel, Competition Iaw and Ęuying Power, 
1E(1) ECIR Ç (1EE8).
108 Ğor a comparative analysis of rules on superior bargaining power, see ICÍ, 
Report on Ėbuse of Superior Ęargaining Position (2008), available at httpÈCC
www.internationalcompetitionnetworÔ.orgCuploadsClibraryCdocĊ8Ď.pdf.
is also a well-known concept in the fields of contract law 
and unfair competition law,109 where it has given rise to a 
considerable literature attempting to unveil its theoretical 
underpinnings.110 Authors usually contrast the use of this 
concept in these areas of law, where the focus is on the 
unfairness of the process of exchange, with the efforts to 
integrate this rule in the field of competition law, where the 
emphasis is usually put on outcomes, such as efficiency or 
consumer welfare. The underlying objective of contract 
law or unfair competition statutes consists in regulating 
the contest between contracting parties and ensuring a 
relatively equalized landscape of bargaining capacity, 
bargaining power being interpreted as the interplay of 
the parties’ actual power relationship in an exchange 
transaction.111 On the contrary, competition law defines 
bargaining power more generally, in terms of the ability 
of an undertaking to introduce a deviation from the price 
or quantity obtained from the competitive situation in 
the market in which the transaction takes place. In this 
context, buying power denotes the ability of a buyer to 
achieve more favourable terms than those available to 
other buyers or what would otherwise be expected under 
normal competitive conditions. This  approach empha-
sizes the gain resulting from the presence of bargaining 
power relative to a situation in which it is absent (not 
necessarily that of perfect competition),112 focusing on 
market structure and concentration.113
3.  It is usually thought that superior (or unequal) 
bargaining power may constitute a competition law 
problem as long as it leads to negative welfare effects 
in terms of pricing, choice or innovation, these 
10E See, for instance, for contract law, at the EĮ level, Ėrticle ÇÈ10E (eŔǼart. Ď.10E) 
of the Principles of European Contract Iaw 2002 on eŔcessive benefit or unfair 
advantage because at the time of the conclusion of the contract ´was dependent 
on or had a relationship of trust with the other party, was in economic distress 
or had urgent needs, was improvident, ignorant, inexperienced or lacking 
in bargaining skillµÉ Principle 10 of the Graft Common Ğrame of Reference 
(GCĞR) concerning restrictions to the principle of the freedom of contract 
because of ineØuality of bargaining power (even in the conteŔt of Ę2Ę relations) 
and the contract law subǼdoctrines that eŔplicitly or implicitly incorporate 
bargaining power such as unconscionability, duress, undue inÁuence, the parol 
evidence rule and public policy. On unfair competition, again at the EĮ level, 
see Green Paper on unfair trading practices in the businessǼtoǼbusiness food 
and nonǼfood supply chain in Europe COÌ(201Ċ) Ċ7É Communication of the 
Commission, TacÔling unfair trading practices in the businessǼtoǼbusiness food 
supply chain, COÌ(201Ç) Ç72 final.
110 See in particular the seminal cases Lloyds Bank Ltd v. Bundy L1E7ÇĽ EJCĖ 
Civ 8 (EJCĖ (Civ))É Macaulay v. Schroeder Publishing Co Ltd L1E7ÇĽ 1 JIRÉ 
and the following critical and eŔplanatory appraisal by S. Í. Thal, IneØuality of 
Ęargaining Power GoctrineÈ The Problem of Gefining Contractual Įnfairness, 
(1E88) 8 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 17É Ì. J. TrebilcocÔ, The Goctrine of IneØuality 
of Ęargaining PowerÈ PostǼĘenthamite Economics in the House of Iords 
L1E7ĎĽ University of Toronto L. J. Ċ5EÉ I. Ė. GiÌatteo, EØuity’s Ìodification 
of ContractÈ Ėn Ėnalysis of the Twentieth Century’s EØuitable Reformation 
of Contract Iaw (1EE8) ĊĊ New Eng. L. Rev. 2Ď5É and more recently Ė. Choi 
and G. Triantis, The Effect of Ęargaining Power on Contract Gesign L2012Ľ Va. 
L. Rev. 1ĎĎ5.
111 Ket, it is important to note that regulatory interventions in order to rebalance 
contractual ineØuality are still designed as eŔceptions to the principle of 
the freedom of contract and the certainty of the contract, especially in Ę2Ę 
contracts, where a very limited power to rebalance the contractual arrangement 
is generally left to the discretion of the Óudge.
112 See, R. ClarÔe, S. Gavies, P. J. Gobson and Ì. Jaterson, Ęuyer Power and 
Competition in European Food Retailing (Edward Elgar 2002). 
113 J. T. Gunlop and Ę. Higgins, Ęargaining Power and ÌarÔet Structures, (1EÇ2) 
I(1) The Journal of Political Economy 1, ÇǼ5É R. G. Íoll, ´Ęuyer Powerµ and 
Economic Policy, (2005) 72 Antitrust Law J. 58E. Ce
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“competition law concerns” being carefully distinguished 
from “non-competition” law concerns.114 Two views are 
usually advanced with regard to the interaction of provi-
sions on superior bargaining power and competition 
law. First, considerable effort has been spent in order to 
mould the concept of superior bargaining power into the 
competition law and economics traditional framework 
by bringing adjustments to traditional competition law 
concepts such as relevant market and market power115 or 
focusing competition law enforcement on “buying power.” 
Second, new provisions on superior bargaining power or 
economic dependence, introduced in the competition law 
statutes by some jurisdictions, are typically examined 
from the perspective of efficiency and consumer welfare 
and usually relegated to the outer boundaries of compe-
tition law provisions on abuse of a dominant position, 
for instance on the basis of an error cost analysis,116 or 
the perception that fairness concerns have little role to 
play in modern competition law.117 Provisions on superior 
bargaining power are examined from a public choice 
perspective as a by-product of the political pressure of 
organised interests of small and medium undertakings 
or farmers, leading to the adoption of mainly redistrib-
utive statutes that restrict competition and presumably 
economic efficiency. From this angle, the existence of a 
superior bargaining power of retailers in the procure-
ment markets does not necessarily give rise to market 
power at the selling side, harming final consumers. Price 
transmission from producer to consumer prices seems 
to have worked so far in favour of final consumers, as 
producer price increases during the period of the recent 
rise of commodity prices in 2008 have been partially 
absorbed by the food retail sector through a reduction 
114 Recent empirical worÔ has relativiŖed the impact of the superior bargaining 
power of retailers, as this is eŔemplified by rising consolidation and increasing 
concentration levels, on priceÈ see E. Ciapanna and C. Rondinelli, Retail ÌarÔet 
Structure and Consumer prices in the Euro Ėrea, ECB Working Paper Series, 
Ío. 17ÇÇ, Gecember 201Ç (observing that larger concentration of retailers on the 
purchasing side of the procurement marÔet is associated with lower consumer 
prices). See also, European Commission, GG COÌP, The Economic Impact 
of Ìodern Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EĮ Ğood Sector, (201Ç), 
available at httpÈCCec.europa.euCcompetitionCpublicationsCĦG021ÇE55EÍÍ.pdf 
(noting that consumer choice was not affected by the rise of concentration levels 
at retail, although innovation may have been). 
115 See, for instance,  20 of the German Ėct against Restraints of Competition 
on “relative and superior market powerµ (relative und absolute Marktmach).
11Ď See, for instance, Ğ. Jagner von Papp, Įnilateral conduct by nonǼdominant 
firmsÈ a comparative reappraisal, ĖSCOIĖ ToÔyo Conference (2015), (on 
file with the author, shortly available at the SSRÍ) conducting an ´error 
cost analysisµ and advancing the view that dominance, and conseØuently the 
definition of a relevant marÔet, is a necessary condition for a superior bargaining 
power to be considered as a competition law problem and recognising the 
countervailing impact that subsidiary contract law enforcement would have on 
error costs. Ėn error cost analysis conducted in abstracto may underestimate the 
transaction costs associated with the use of the specific legal process, which may 
vary from Óurisdiction to Óurisdiction and in some cases may be less important 
in the conteŔt of competition law enforcement than other alternatives. Error 
cost analysis may also lead to the ´sin of single institutional analysis” see, 
Ħ. Í. Ħomesar Law’s Limits, (CambridgeÈ Cambridge Įniversity Press, 2001) 
as it will emphasiŖe the defects of one institutional alternative (e.g. competition 
law) on some aspects to argue for an eŔpansive role of another, probably eØually 
defective in some other aspects, institutional choiceÈ contract law or unfair 
competition law statutes. 
117 See, for instance, P. ĖÔman, The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law 
(Hart Pub. 2012), Ch. Ç.
of profit margins, at least in the old Member States.118 
It remains to be seen if  the most recent decrease of food 
prices will also be passed on to consumers or if  we will 
face a situation of asymmetric price transmission from 
producer to consumer food prices.119 Similarly, the recent 
Modern Retail Study of the European Commission 
noted that the increase in the overall retail concentration 
has been counter-balanced to a certain extent by consol-
idation in the processing and manufacturing indus-
tries for certain products, such as coffee, frozen ready 
cooked meals, baby food120. Finally, critics of the concept 
of superior bargaining power usually explain that the 
complexity of the problems raised by unequal bargaining 
power between retailers and suppliers cannot be solved 
by competition law and a more integrated framework 
is needed, combining the enforcement of competition 
law, when there is conduct that enters its scope, but also 
unfair trading practices laws, provisions of contract law 
and more generally civil law (tort law, European sales 
law), which aim to deal with abusive use of unequal 
bargaining power, and finally, soft law and self-regulatory 
initiatives by the industry that have emerged in several 
Member States.121 The argument is often made that 
competition law may be less effective in dealing with the 
problem than these other areas of law, without, however, 
that conclusion being based on a thorough comparative 
institutional analysis that also examines the institutional 
and social norms related constraints that may limit the 
remedial potential of other areas of law to deal with the 
problem.122 
4. This paper aims to question this quick dismissal of 
superior bargaining power from the traditional competi-
tion law framework. First, from a normative perspective, 
118 I. ĘuÔeviciute, Ė. GierŔ and Ğ. IlŖÔovitŖ, The functioning of the food supply 
chain and its effect on food prices in the European Įnion, (200E) European 
Economy, Occasional Papers Ç7, 1Ç.
11E Ėsymmetric transmission is often linÔed to the eŔistence of marÔet power at a 
level of the value chainÈ OECG, Ğood Price Ğormation, October 2015, available 
at httpÈCCwww.oecd.orgCsiteCagrfcnCmeetingsCagrfcnǼ7ǼfoodǼpriceǼformationǼ
paperǼoctoberǼ2015.pdfÉ in a 200E report for the European Commission, 
I. ĘuÔeviciute, Ė. GierŔ and Ğ. IlŖÔovitŖ, The functioning of the food supply 
chain and its effect on food prices in the European Įnion, (200E) European 
Economy, Occasional Papers Ç7, 18, noted that for the euro area, ´the 
magnitude of the transmission is similar in the case of a price increase and a 
price decrease.µ
120 European Commission, GG COÌP, The Economic Impact of Ìodern Retail 
on Choice and Innovation in the EĮ Ğood Sector, (201Ç), available at httpÈCC
ec.europa.euCcompetitionCpublicationsCĦG021ÇE55EÍÍ.pdf, 218, Ċ0ÇǼĊ77.
121 On a discussion of the possible combinations between these different tools 
across Ìember States, see Ğinal Report, Study on the Iegal ĞrameworÔ Covering 
Ęusiness ² to Ęusiness Įnfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain, 
Ğinal Report (2Ď Ğebruary 201Ç), available at httpÈCCec.europa.euCinternalŁ 
marÔetCretailCdocsC1Ç0711ǼstudyǼutpǼlegalǼframeworÔŁen.pdf.
122 These may, for instance, relate to inefficient Óudicial systems with few 
capabilities to engage with the economic underpinnings of superior bargaining 
power, in comparison to the more eŔpert competition authorities, entrenched 
power relations that maÔe it difficult for suppliers to bring contractual disputes 
against retailer networÔs and raise a contract law point based on economic 
duress or unconscionability against a partner with superior bargaining power, 
a complaint to the competition authority offering in this case a better option, in 
view of the farǼreaching remedies that a competition law violation may give rise 
to and that neither contract law nor unfair competition law offer. Even if private 
enforcement of competition law is more freØuently used in these instances, 
competition authorities focusing on cartels as their enforcement priority, it 
might still be preferable from the point of view of the parties, in view of the 
general hostility of contract law Óudges to legal intervention in order to rebalance 
contractual ineØuality. Ce
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the role the concept of superior bargaining power may 
play in competition law enforcement becomes particularly 
significant, should one abandon a narrow neoclassical 
price theory (NPT) efficiency or consumer welfare driven 
perspective for an approach that would seek to preserve 
the competitive process or even one that will be inspired 
by political economy considerations and a “holistic” 
competition law model.123 In our view, the global value 
chain approach, developed by political economists and 
economic sociologists, provides the appropriate theoret-
ical framework in order to better understand the inter-
action between suppliers and retailers in the food sector 
and enable us, on this basis, to design competition law 
interventions (II.). Second, from a descriptive perspec-
tive, we note that legislators and competition author-
ities do not share the antitrust law pessimism usually 
displayed by authors inspired by the NPT paradigm 
towards the concept of superior bargaining power, and 
have increasingly engaged with it, in the context of tradi-
tional competition law enforcement with regard to retail 
consolidation through buying alliances or mergers (III.). 
Finally, we observe the framing of new tools of compe-
tition law intervention in order to deal with situations of 
superior bargaining power in specific settings related to 
the food value chain (IV.).
II. The global value 
chain perspective
5. The structure of the food value chain and the relation-
ship between the firms operating in it has changed dras-
tically the last two decades.124 Agriculture and agri-food 
production has taken advantage of technological inno-
vation becoming more industrialised125 and globalised.126 
Modern information systems enable suppliers to receive 
directly signals over the preferences of consumers for 
higher quality products, the private sector responding by 
creating “value chains” with the aim to reduce, through 
the exercise of control, the uncertainty emerging out 
of their interaction with a number of economic actors 
present in different market segments (and for which they 
do not dispose sufficient information). The globalisation 
of the economy has also led to the development of a trans-
national mode of production, with a number of produc-
tion facilities dispersed in various jurisdictions, thus 
12Ċ On the perils and advantages of ´ holisticµ competition law, see I. Iianos, Some 
ReÁections on the Ïuestion of the Goals of EĮ Competition Iaw, in Handbook 
in EU Competition Law: Substantive Aspects, I. Iianos and G. Geradin (eds.), 
(Edward Elgar, 201Ċ), 1Ǽ8Ç.
12Ç J. Ğ. Ì. Swinnen, Global Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor How the 
Globalization of Food Systems and Standards Affects Rural Development and 
Poverty (CĖĘI 2007) 1.
125 J. Humphrey and O. Ìemedovic, Global Value Chains in the Ėgrifood Sector 
L200ĎĽ ĮÍIGO 5, available at httpÈCCagris.fao.orgCagrisǼsearchCsearch.doĒrecordIG 
ĚGĘ201Ċ2022EĊ.
12Ď G. Gereffi and Ì. Ì. Christian, Trade, Transnational Corporations and Ğood 
ConsumptionÈ Ė Global Value Chain Ėpproach, in Trade, Food, Diet and Health 
Perspectives and Policy Options (2010), C. HawÔes, C. Ęlouin, S. Henson, 
Í. Grager, I. GubŮ (eds.), Ċ, available atÈ httpÈCCpapers.ssrn.comCsolĊCpapers.cfmĒ 
abstractŁidĚ15ĎÇEÇ8.
increasing the need to put in place transnational value 
chains reducing the resulting uncertainty of dealing with 
foreign economic actors. One may also trace the devel-
opment of value chains in the expansion of national and 
international regulations regarding consumer protec-
tion, food safety and quality, for instance regulation 
imposing the traceability of food, feed, at all stages of 
production, processing and distribution (e.g. EU Regu-
lation 178/2002,127 the WTO sanitary and phytosani-
tary standards, Codex Alimentarius). The private sector 
complies with such regulations by establishing standards 
and specific codes of conduct managed by industry asso-
ciations or non-governmental organizations. Being at the 
one end of the value chain, retailers develop strategies 
with the aim to build store loyalty, thus enabling them to 
extract a more significant part of the total surplus value. 
Because of this direct interaction with consumers and 
the need to preserve store loyalty, retail networks have 
more incentives than suppliers to control potential risks 
at the various nodes of the supply chain (e.g. in order 
to guarantee product safety).128 For this reason, “buyer-
driven” chains develop private food standards, which 
operate on top of public regulations. As a result of these 
developments, the food value chain is increasingly struc-
tured around “global value chains” (GVCs), which permit 
the simultaneous and coordinated production and distri-
bution of a very large array of products that each stage 
of the supply chain has to manage effectively, without 
this involving vertical integration by ownership.129
6. The GVC approach provides a theoretical framework 
enabling us to understand how the global division and 
integration of labour in the world economy has evolved 
over time and, more importantly, how the distribution of 
awards, from the total surplus value, is allocated between 
the various segments of the chain.130 The starting point 
for the development of this framework was the growing 
importance of new global buyers (big retail) constituting 
“buyer-driven global commodity chains.” The framework 
also shares Michael Porter’s emphasis on “value systems” 
a concept that has been used in order to describe a set 
of inter-firm linkages through which different economic 
actors (and their value chains) are interconnected.131 
Hence, contrary to traditional NPT analysis, and 
more in vogue with transaction cost economics (TCE) 
and  economics of organization, the GVC approach 
does not mainly focus on issues of horizontal market 
127 Regulation 178C2002 of the European Parliament and the European Council 
laying down the general principles and reØuirements of food law, establishing 
the European Ğood Safety Ėuthority and laying down procedures in matters of 
food safety L2002Ľ OJ I Ċ1C1.
128 J. Iee, G. Gereffi and J. Ęeauvais, Global value chains and agrifood standardsÈ 
Challenges and possibilities for smallholders in developing countries, (2012) 
10E (Ċ1) Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 12Ċ2ĎǼ12ĊĊ1, 12Ċ28.
12E Ħ. Ge ĘacÔer and S. Ìiroudot, Ìapping Global Value Chains, European 
Central ĘanÔ, Working Paper Series, Ío. 1Ď77, Ìay 201Ç. 
1Ċ0 On the GVC frameworÔ and its predecessor Global Commodity Chains, 
see G. Gereffi and Ì. ĦorŖienewicŖ (eds.), Commodity Chains and Global 
Capitalism (JestportÈ Praeger, 1EEÇ)É G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, 
The governance of global value chains, (2005) 12(1) Review of International 
Political Economy 78Ǽ10Ç.
1Ċ1 Ì. Porter, Competitive ĖdvantageÈ Creating and Sustaining Superior 
Performance (Ğree Press, 1E85). Ce
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2Ď Concurrences N° 1-2016 I On-Topic I Competition law and policy and the food value chain
power and concentration at each segment of the chain, 
but engages with the vertical links between the various 
actors with the aim to understand how and whether 
“lead” actors can capture value. Hence, its focus is on the 
distribution of the value generated by the chain, rather 
than the maximization of the surplus (efficiency) as 
such. GVC’s “holistic view” of global industries focuses 
on the governance of the value chain, that is, how some 
actors can shape the distribution of profits and risks in 
the chain. Taking a political economy perspective, the 
GVC approach explores the way economic actors may 
maintain or improve (“upgrade”) their position in the 
global value chain, “economic upgrading” being defined 
as “the process by which economic actors—firms and 
workers— move from low-value to relatively high-value 
activities in GVC.”132 
7. A typology of GVC governance structures was elab-
orated with the aim to describe and explain the driving 
forces for the constitution of global value chains. 
According to Gereffi  et al., there are “three key deter-
minants of value chain governance patterns: complexity 
of transactions, codifiability of information; and capa-
bility of suppliers.”133 His framework is broader than the 
framework often employed by TCE in order to explain 
the prevalence of certain forms of organization (hierarchy 
versus the market system), as the latter focuses only on 
the determinants of asset specificity and the frequency 
of the transactions as the driving forces for organiza-
tional choice.134 The GVC framework draws inspira-
tion from the resource-based or competences-based 
view of the firm,135 according to which firms as path-de-
pendent entities characterised by heterogeneous compe-
tence bases and operating under conditions of genuine 
uncertainty, their existence being justified by the devel-
opment of productive competencies and learning for a 
specific cognitive community that forms the firm’s core. 
Contrary to what TCE predicts, firms will not necessarily 
develop specific capabilities and learning in order to 
engage in certain value activities, because for instance of 
economies of scale and the frequency of transactions, as 
they may be unable to develop the capabilities which are 
necessary for them to participate in certain value chain 
activities; they will be thus obliged to appeal to external 
resources.136 Contrary to the contract theory of the firm, 
pioneered by TCE, the competence-base view of the firm 
1Ċ2 G. Gereffi, Global value chains in a postǼJashington Consensus world, (201Ç) 
21(1) Review of International Political Economy EǼĊ7, 18.
133 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, The governance of global value 
chains, (2005) 12(1) Review of International Political Economy 78Ǽ10Ç, 8Ç.
134 In a nutshell, the more there is asset specificity and the interaction is longǼ
term, the more it is Óustifiable to invest resources in order to build a hierarchy 
form of organiŖation.
1Ċ5 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, The governance of global value 
chains, (2005) 12(1) Review of International Political Economy 78Ǽ10Ç, 81.
1ĊĎ The competence or resourceǼbases view of the firm draws on worÔ by 
E. Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (OŔford Įniversity PressÈ 
OŔford, 1E5E). See, more generally, Í. J. Ğoss, The Theory of the ĞirmÈ 
Contractual and Competence Perspectives, (1EEĊ) Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics, Ċ, 127Ǽ1ÇÇÉ G. Ì. Hodgson, Evolutionary and competenceǼbased 
theories of the firm, (1EE8) 25(1) Journal of Economic Studies, 25Ǽ5Ď.
enquires into the sources of the competitive advantage 
and the path-dependent process of accumulation of such 
capabilities. Although the GVC framework adopts the 
markets and hierarchy categories of TCE, it perceives 
them as part of a continuum, the network category, 
which it then analyses as three distinct types of govern-
ance regime. In a nutshell, the GVC framework advances 
the following five governance categories:
–  Markets where the costs of switching to new 
partners is very low;
–  Modular value chains where suppliers make 
products to a customer’s specifications, 
without however making transaction-specific 
investments that will generate a situation of 
mutual dependence or just dependence;
–  Relational value chains in which complex 
interactions between buyers and sellers often 
create mutual dependence and high levels of 
asset specificity;
–  Captive value chains where relatively small 
suppliers face significant switching costs and 
are “captive” to large buyers, such networks 
being characterized by a high degree of 
monitoring and control by lead firms;
–  Hierarchy which denotes situations of vertical 
integration with the exercise of managerial 
control.137
The operation of the key determinants of global value 
chain governance is described in the following table.
Table 1: Key determinants of global value chain 
governance
Governance 
type
Complexity 
of 
transactions
Ability 
to codify 
transactions
Capabilities 
in the 
supply-base
Degree 
of explicit 
coordination 
and power 
asymmetry
Market Low High High Low
Modular High High High ↕Relational High Low HighCaptive High High Low
Hierarchy High Low Low High
8. Of particular interest for the purposes of examining 
superior bargaining power is the category of captive value 
chains where power is exercised by “lead firms,” in most 
cases these being modern retailers and supermarkets who 
drive the agri-food chain, linking daily groceries’ consumers 
with small farmers around the world. In this context, 
supplier’s capabilities are relatively low, the complexity of 
product specifications being high and amenable to codifi-
cation. In the face of complex products and specifications, 
the “lead” firms have important incentives and abilities to 
intervene and to control the chain, thus building up trans-
actional dependence and locking in suppliers. The latter 
1Ċ7 G. Gereffi, J. Humphrey and T. Sturgeon, The governance of global value 
chains, (2005) 12(1) Review of International Political Economy 78Ǽ10Ç, 8Ç. Ce
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are confined to a narrow set of tasks (for instance, provide 
raw products or simple assembly) and are dependent on 
the “lead firm” for complementary value adding activ-
ities, such as branding, marketing, commercialisation, 
advertising. As a consequence of this configuration, “lead 
firms” are able to reap the overwhelming part of the total 
surplus-value of the chain. In contrast, in relational value 
chains the power balance between retailers and suppliers is 
more symmetrical, as suppliers’ capabilities are high, thus 
each firm is contributing key competencies leading to a 
situation of mutual dependence. Trust rather than power 
constitutes in this case the main mechanism of coordina-
tion of the value chain. 
9. This classification of various forms of organization of 
the value chain highlights the importance of conducting 
a careful analysis of the power relations along the supply 
chain, the aim being to unveil value extraction bottle-
necks affecting the distribution of the total surplus 
value.138 This analysis cannot be undertaken by the tradi-
tional NPT framework which mainly focuses on hori-
zontal competition and its effects on consumers or total 
welfare and assesses the competitive interactions between 
firms within a specific relevant market. In contrast, the 
GVC perspective has a purely distributive focus and 
may be particularly helpful if  one aims to understand 
real business strategies and how the design of the value 
chain may determine who profits from the collective 
innovation and other surplus value generated, the inter-
country distribution of  the total surplus value, in the 
case of  transnational networks, if  one takes a political 
economy perspective, and more broadly the impact of 
value extraction bottlenecks on the competitive process, 
the latter concept being intrinsically related to an evolu-
tionary perspective on economic change. GVC analysis 
may question the mechanistic view of  the countervailing 
bargaining theory argument, claiming for instance that 
the consolidation and increasing concentration at the 
supplier level may curtail the rising power of  retailers, 
by emphasizing the risk of the development of “bilateral 
oligopolies” of  consolidated producers and retailers 
and subsequently of  double marginalisation that may 
harm consumers and the competitive process.139
10.  We consider that such an approach is particularly 
helpful, and this not only in the context of global value 
chains affecting developing or emergent economies140, 
which is a topic that has attracted some attention, in view 
of the necessity to promote a political economy framework 
1Ċ8 R. I. Steiner, Intrabrand CompetitionǼStepchild of Ėntitrust (1EE1) ĊĎ The 
Antitrust Bulletin 155, has also emphasiŖed the role of ´vertical competition” 
and ´vertical market power” in his “dual-stage modelµ of competition law 
assessment. However, he does not offer an analytical competition law frameworÔ 
which will go beyond the classic ÍPT focus on horiŖontal concentration and 
the possibility of vertical marÔet power to transform itself to horiŖontal marÔet 
(selling or procurement) power.
1ĊE J. Iee, G. Gereffi and J. Ęeauvais, Global value chains and agrifood standardsÈ 
Challenges and possibilities for smallholders in developing countries, (2012) 
10E (Ċ1) Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 12Ċ2ĎǼ12ĊĊ1, 12Ċ2E.
1Ç0 See, for instance, R. ĦaplinsÔy, Competitions Policy and the Global Coffee 
and Cocoa Value Chains, Paper prepared for the Įnited Íations Conference for 
Trade and Gevelopment (Institute of Gevelopment Studies, SusseŔ, Ęrighton, 
200Ç), available at httpsÈCCwww.ids.ac.uÔCfilesCRĦaplinsÔycocoacoffee05.pdf.
that will enable local firms to participate to global value 
chains and thus to capture value, or to “upgrade” existing 
capabilities and to create “domestic” added value. It may 
also be relevant in the context of a developed countries’ 
club, such as the EU, in view of the heterogeneity of 
productive capabilities that one may observe between the 
North and the South/East part of the Continent and the 
establishment of value chains with “lead” firms (mostly 
based in the North of Europe) extracting an important 
share of the total surplus value. Article 3(3) of Regulation 
1/2003 offers some policy space by explicitly authorizing 
Member States to adopt and apply provisions of national 
law that predominantly pursue an objective different from 
that pursued by Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, for instance, 
legislation that “prohibits undertakings from imposing on 
their trading partners, obtaining or attempting to obtain 
from them terms and conditions that are unjustified, dispro-
portionate or without consideration.”141 Hence, Member 
States dispose of the necessary policy space to implement 
rules that aim to curtail superior bargaining power and 
its distributional consequences, if they judge that this is 
justified from a political economy perspective (for instance, 
because of an unbalanced inter-country distribution of 
the total value chain surplus). Although, no authority 
has for the time being relied on the GVC framework, the 
concepts and measurement devices they have developed so 
far may gain in clarity if some effort is spent in integrating 
the GVC learning in competition law assessment.
III. The rising interest 
of competition 
authorities in superior 
bargaining power 
11.  Several national antitrust authorities have recently 
delved into the concept of superior bargaining power in 
the food-retail sector and commissioned studies in order 
to better operationalize superior bargaining power in 
competition law enforcement and develop measurement 
tools.142 
141 Recital E and Ėrticle Ċ(Ċ) of Regulation 1C200Ċ.
1Ç2 See, for instance, Competition Commission, The Supply of Groceries in the 
ĮĦ ÌarÔet Investigation, available at httpÈCCwebarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uÔC201Ç0Ç021Ç1250ChttpÈCCwww.competitionǼcommission.org.uÔCassetsC 
competitioncommissionCdocsCpdfCnonǼinØuiryCrepŁpubCreportsC2008C
fullteŔtC5Ċ8.pdfÉ Italian Competition Ėuthority, Indagine Conoscitiva 
Sul Settore Gella GGO’ (201Ċ) ICÇĊ, available at httpÈCCwww.agcm.itC
indaginiǼconoscitiveǼdb.htmlÉ ĘundesÔartellamt, SeÔtoruntersuchung 
Íachfragemacht Im IebensmitteleinŖelhandel (201Ç) Ę2Ǽ15C11 ĘĦartĖ, 
available at httpÈCCwww.bundesÔartellamt.deCSeÔtoruntersuchungŁIEH.pdfĒŁŁ
blobĚpublicationĞileÄvĚ7É ĖutoritŮ de la concurrence, Opinion 15ǼĖǼ0Ď of Ċ1 
Ìarch 2015 Concerning the Joint Purchasing Ėgreements in the Ğood Retail 
Sector, available at httpÈCCwww.autoritedelaconcurrence.frCpdfCavisC15a0Ď.
pdfÉ Ğinnish competition authority, Study on Trade in Groceries ² How Goes 
Ęuyer Power Ėffect The Relations between the Trade and IndustryĒ’ (2012) 1 
ĞCĖ reports, available at httpÈCCwww.ÔÔv.fiCglobalassetsCÔÔvǼsuomiCÓulÔaisutC
selvityÔsetC2012CenCfcaǼreportsǼ1Ǽ2012ǼstudyǼonǼtradeǼinǼgroceries.pdf.
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12. The attention of the competition law enforcers histor-
ically lingers on size and market share or concentration 
of the negotiating parties in order to define their power 
relations.143 However, scholarly studies on contracts and 
negotiations take a game/bargaining theory approach 
arguing that, for the outcome of negotiation, even more 
important than market shares or the size of negoti-
ating parties is the existence of “threat points” enabling 
one of the parties to seek a “best alternative to a nego-
tiated agreement” (BATNA).144 Indeed, the negotiating 
party holding a BATNA has the possibility to resort to 
a valid alternative to the negotiation in progress or to 
the contract concluded, preventing hold-up and threats 
to cease negotiation. In conceiving the bargaining model 
one may take a Nash cooperative bargaining solution as 
the axiomatic starting point,145 or resort to a non-cooper-
ative or sequential bargaining model which will attempt 
to factor in the costs of the delay to agreement, and 
extend this analysis from bilateral bargaining to n-person 
bargaining.146 Although it is not clear if  the results will 
be the same under each of these models, their common 
feature, in contrast to industrial organization theory, is 
that bargaining power is perceived as a concept that can be 
measured with reference to a specific bargaining relation 
in a specific context and it is not dependent on structural 
analysis (for instance the existence of monopsony or 
oligopsony). Bargaining power may also impact on price 
as well as on non-price terms.147 Measuring bargaining 
power is a difficult exercise that scholars and law enforcers 
have tried to engage with, adopting diverse approaches. 
1. Measuring superior 
bargaining power
13.  For instance, in 2014, the Bundeskartellamt 
concluded an in-depth study in the food retail sector, 
where it attempted to measure superior bargaining power 
(“demand side power” – “Nachfragemacht”) econometri-
cally by exploring the conditions of its existence.148 The 
conditions of bargaining power were converted into inde-
143 This is for instance the approach by the Commission in its last report for the 
HIĞ, European Commission, GG COÌP, The Economic Impact of Ìodern 
Retail on Choice and Innovation in the EĮ Ğood SectorÈ Ğinal Report, available 
at httpÈCCec. europa.euCcompetitionCpublicationsCĦG021ÇE55EÍÍ.pdf. 
144 Ė. Renda and others, Study on the Iegal ĞrameworÔ Covering ĘusinessǼ
toǼĘusiness Įnfair Trading Practices in the Retail Supply Chain, Ğinal 
Report (201Ç) GG ÌĖRĦTC2012C0ÇECE 25, available at httpÈCCec.europa.euC
internalŁmarÔetCretailCdocsC1Ç0711ǼstudyǼutpǼlegalǼframeworÔŁen.pdfÉ I. Ėyres 
and Ę. J Íalebuff, Common Ħnowledge as a Ęarrier to Íegotiation (1EEĎ) ÇÇ 
UCLA L. Rev. 1ĎĊ1.
1Ç5 Ìost of these studies have relied on this type of model so far.
1ÇĎ See, for instance, J. Sutton, ÍonǼCooperative Ęargaining TheoryÈ 
Ėn Introduction, (1E8Ď) LIII Review of Economic Studies 70EǼ72ÇÉ Ħ. Ęinmore, 
Ì. J. Osborne, Ė. Rubinstein, ÍonǼCooperative Ìodels of Ęargaining, Chapter 
7 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (Elsevier, 1EE2), 
17EǼ225. 
1Ç7 Ė. Choi and G. Triantis, The Effect of Ęargaining Power on Contract Gesign 
(2012) Va. L. Rev. 1ĎĎ5.
1Ç8 ĘundesÔartellamt, SeÔtoruntersuchung Íachfragemacht Im 
IebensmitteleinŖelhandel (201Ç) Ę2Ǽ15C11 ĘĦartĖ, available at 
httpÈCCwww.bundesÔartellamt.deCSeÔtoruntersuchungŁIEH.pdfĒŁŁ
blobĚpublicationĞileÄvĚ7 (hereinafter ĘundesÔartellamt Ğood Retail Report)
pendent variables used for the econometric assessment. 
The selection of the independent variables was performed 
on the basis of a survey. In particular, the Bundeskartel-
lamt looked into the procurement market of branded 
products for several reasons, including the fact that 
they form the core business of retailers, they are at the 
center of the majority of competition complaints and 
they are easier to compare and identify.149 The authority 
initially divided the products object of negotiations into 
four categories: “product category”,“must-stock items,” 
“items listed at a discounter” and “high-turnover items.” 
Furthermore, they identified seven procurement markets 
with different market structures. In order to identify 
and order the branded products forming the statistical 
population belonging to the sample, the authority used 
the European Article Number (EAN). The authority 
then interviewed the retailers and manufacturers about 
the results of their negotiations on each EAN article. 
In particular, the Bundeskartellamt inquired about 
the switching possibilities to alternative negotiating 
partners and about the overall competitive environment. 
The authority noted that negotiations between producers 
and merchants take place once a year. In these negotia-
tions producers and merchants bargain over the condi-
tions for the business relationships of the following year. 
Yet, the Bundeskartellamt also acknowledged that the 
sole focus on procurement volumes is not sufficiently 
differentiated to provide valid conclusions for the defini-
tion and measurement of demand-side bargaining power. 
For its econometric assessment, the Bundeskartellamt 
considered different determinants in order to describe the 
individual bargaining position of each party and did not 
base itself  only on market concentration and the existence 
of a monopsony or an oligopsony. The bargaining model 
construed on the basis of this theoretical approach can 
be summarized as following:
K [conditions of superior bargaining power] 
= f  (x  [amount ordered]; D1-6 [bargaining 
determinants, which indicates the “Drohpunkte” 
(threat points), that is, the best alternative to 
negotiate ])150. 
1ÇE The other marÔet identified by the ĘundesÔartellamt is the one of private 
labels, which the authority describes as characteriŖed by a different ´bargaining 
logic,µ although deeply inÁuencing the negotiations for branded products. 
Private labels are usually bargained through tenders, while branded products 
are traded with annual negotiations. However, in its econometric study the 
ĘundesÔartellamt states that ´private labels are actually considered in the 
assessment of the ´competitive environmentµ of the branded products,µ see 
ĘundesÔartellamt, Summary of the Ğinal Report of the Sector InØuiry into the 
Ğood Retail Sector, 8. In this connection the ĘundesÔartellamt observes that 
private labels are often considered as part of a different marÔet with respect 
to branded products. However, they can be often used in negotiations to put 
pressure on manufacturers of branded products, at 11.
150 Hence, the ĘundesÔartellamt especially focusses on the walÔǼaway point in the 
specific negotiation and how it is inÁuenced by different factors for each party. Ce
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These are the following:
1. Alternative distribution paths for producer p 
(other than with retailer r) or even alternative 
production paths (switching to different product) 
= outside options of producer;151
2. Outside options of retailer: importance of the 
product for the retailer (is delisting a credible 
threat?);152
3. Brand strength: if  consumers expect certain 
brands, then delisting is improbable;153
4. Competition by other producers/brands which 
creates opportunities for r to circumvent p;154
5. r’s own brands (“Handelsmarken”): these must 
be substitutable for brands of p, and p must 
not be (by chance) the actual producer of r’s 
own brands; the Report notes the trend towards 
private labels even in the premium segment;155
6. Buyer cooperation: bundling buying power156.
14. The conditions adopted for this analysis were not only 
price terms but also non-price terms, such as deadline for 
payment and agreements on delivery. A fundamental 
stage of the Bundeskartellamt’s assessment was the 
reckoning of the importance of a retailer for its suppliers 
and the evaluation of the “outside options” of both 
parties. The definition of “outside option” given by the 
authority resembles closely to the one of the BATNA, 
“the better a party’s outside options, the better the condi-
tions that party is able to negotiate.”157 Not surprisingly, 
the Bundeskartellamt concluded in this study that the 
purchasing volumes “have a decisive impact on the nego-
tiating conditions,”158 and therefore constitute one of the 
main advantages of major retailers vis-à-vis their smaller 
competitors in negotiations. Furthermore, the authority 
determined that the well-known branded products 
“the delisting of which would most likely result in a dispro-
151 ĘundesÔartellamt Ğood Retail Report, Ċ21.
152 ĘundesÔartellamt Ğood Retail Report, Ċ22.
15Ċ ĘundesÔartellamt Ğood Retail Report, Ċ2Ċ.
15Ç ĘundesÔartellamt Ğood Retail Report, Ċ2Ç. However the ĘundesÔartellamt 
states that this is only true if two conditions are assumed. Ğirstly the other brand 
has to pose a sufficient substitution to the article which is the subÓect of the 
negotiations and secondly that the producer of the relevant article is not also 
the producer of the alternative trade brand. The ĘundesÔartellamt measures the 
value of this inÁuence with the help of a survey in which the undertaÔings were 
asÔed to assess the importance of alternative brands. Ğurthermore the survey 
asÔed for an assessment of the substitutability of the specific article through the 
alternative on a scale from 0Ã to 100 Ã..
155 ĘundesÔartellamt Ğood Retail Report, Ċ2ÇǼĊ25.
15Ď Ìembership in a buyer group reduces the outsideǼoptions of the supplier and 
thereby may lead to better conditions for the demand side. The impact of the 
membership is measured by adding a variable which is 1 for ´yesµ and 0 for 
´noµ. In a second step it is measured whether an undertaÔing is a ´bigµ or a 
´smallµ member of such a group. Thereby a variable only gets the value one, 
when the undertaÔing is not the one with the highest turnover in the group.
157 ĘundesÔartellamt, Summary of the Ğinal Report of the Sector InØuiry into the 
Ğood Retail Sector, 10. 
158 ĘundesÔartellamt, Summary of the Ğinal Report of the Sector InØuiry into the 
Ğood Retail Sector, 10.
portionate decline in turnover for that retail company, has 
the effect that its manufacturer is able to achieve better 
conditions.”159 In such cases, the producer is in a stronger 
bargaining position, since the retailer has no BATNA.160
15.  In a 2012 sector inquiry, the Italian Competition 
Authority studied the bargaining power of retailers 
and suppliers on the basis of three different “clusters” 
of undertakings, reaching comparable results.161 These 
“clusters” were obtained by comparing several data, 
including the overall turnover, the number of retailers 
supplied, the “strength” of the brand (especially in the 
specific geographic area). In particular, these three groups 
or “clusters” were: i) undertakings with high bargaining 
power; ii) undertakings with medium bargaining power 
and iii) undertakings with low bargaining power.162 The 
data published by the ICA relatively differs from that of 
the Bundeskartellamt, but still shows a situation of prev-
alence of retailers’ superior bargaining position, irre-
spective of market concentration levels. On the basis 
of their clusters, the ICA concluded that in the 23.4% 
of their sample, the supplier holds a strong bargaining 
position (not necessarily stronger than the retailer) and is 
not economically dependent on the retailer. In the 48.8% 
of cases, the suppliers showed an intermediate degree 
of dependence from the retailers. Finally, the 27.8% of 
the sample highlighted a high level of dependence.163 It 
is worth observing that both the Italian and German 
retail sectors are moderately concentrated, if  compared 
to others such as the Finnish, Latvian or Swedish.164
16. Both studies by the German and the Italian competi-
tion authorities engage with what may be considered as 
captive value chains in the GVC approach terminology 
and attempt to develop appropriate measurement tools 
for superior bargaining power. Competition authorities 
have also attempted to gauge with superior bargaining 
power in exploring certain conduct that reinforces retail 
power vis-à-vis farmers or processors.
15E ĘundesÔartellamt, Summary of the Ğinal Report of the Sector InØuiry into the 
Ğood Retail Sector, 10.
1Ď0 However, these soǼcalled ´mustǼhaveµ products accounted only to ĎÃ of the 
sample adopted by the authority that, according to the same authority, can be 
reasonably taÔen as representative of the whole foodǼretail national marÔet.
1Ď1 Italian Competition Ėuthority, ÌarÔet Investigation in the Retail Sector 
(2012).
1Ď2 Italian Competition Ėuthority, ÌarÔet Investigation in the Retail Sector 
(2012), 1Ď2.
1ĎĊ Italian Competition Ėuthority, ÌarÔet Investigation in the Retail Sector 
(2012), 1Ď2.
1ĎÇ European Commission, The Economic Impact of Ìodern Retail on Choice 
and Innovation in the EĮ Ğood Sector, 1Ċ1. Ce
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Ċ0 Concurrences N° 1-2016 I On-Topic I Competition law and policy and the food value chain
2. Purchasing cooperation 
agreements and superior 
bargaining power
17. NCAs have increasingly looked into buying alliances 
and joint purchasing agreements concluded between 
major retail chains, these agreements becoming more 
common following the food crisis of 2008. Group 
purchasing organisations (“GPOs”) may take different 
forms of governance structure depending on the level of 
integration they select, spanning from jointly controlled 
companies to looser forms of cooperation, collectively 
referred to as “joint purchasing arrangements”165. From 
the point of view of the size of retailers, group purchasing 
organisations are generally of two types. The first type 
consists in a multilateral agreement formed by retailers of 
the same size which by bundling their purchase volumes 
intend to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
suppliers. Recently, however, antitrust authorities regis-
tered a tendency to form purchasing groups where there 
is one dominant retailer and several smaller retailers.166 
In this type of agreements, the smaller retailers generally 
issue mandate contracts to the “head” of the purchasing 
cooperation in order to negotiate the conditions of 
procurement for the whole organisation. These forms of 
cooperation generally include several other conditions in 
order to coordinate selling practices and share informa-
tion, especially about procurement costs.167 The findings 
of the national competition authorities corroborate 
the view that these purchasing cooperation agreements 
have, in many cases, an almost negligible effect on the 
bargaining power of the major retailers, while, in the 
short term, they improve the bargaining position of the 
smaller retailers.168 This is true even when, as it is appar-
ently the case, the head of the purchasing organisation 
does not pass on the benefit of the bargain in whole.169 
Yet these agreements may also lead to long-term forms 
of cooperation, including the sharing of sensitive infor-
mation, and may create the conditions for the economic 
dependence of the smaller retailers that often structure 
their business model to the one dictated by the cooper-
ation agreement.170 In addition, the coordination of the 
selling practices may cause the “homogenization” of the 
1Ď5 European Commission, Guidelines on the Ėpplicability of Ėrticle 101 of the 
Treaty on the Ğunctioning of the European Įnion to HoriŖontal CoǼOperation 
Ėgreements, vol OJ L2011Ľ C 11, 1EÇ, available at httpÈCCeurǼleŔ.europa.euC
IeŔĮriServCIeŔĮriServ.doĒuriĚOJÈCÈ2011È011È0001È0072ÈEÍÈPGĞ.
1ĎĎ See, for instance, Italian Competition Ėuthority, Case I7Ď8 Centrale Italiana 
S.c a r.lÉ ĘundesÔartellamt, Summary of the Ğinal Report of the Sector InØuiry 
into the Ğood Retail Sector, 5É ĖutoritŮ de la concurrence, Opinion 15ǼĖǼ0Ď of 
Ċ1 Ìarch 2015 Concerning the Joint Purchasing Ėgreements in the Ğood Retail 
Sector.
1Ď7 This is for instance the situation described by the ICĖ in the Case Centrale 
Italiana S.c. a r.l.
1Ď8 ĘundesÔartellamt Ğood Retail ReportÉ Italian Competition Ėuthority Case 
Centrale Italiana S.c. a r.l.É ĖutoritŮ de la concurrence, Opinion 15ǼĖǼ0Ď of Ċ1 
Ìarch 2015 Concerning the Joint Purchasing Ėgreements in the Ğood Retail 
Sector.
1ĎE ĘundesÔartellamt Ğood Retail ReportÉ Case I7Ď8 Centrale Italiana S.c. a r.l.
170 ĘundesÔartellamt, Summary of the Ğinal Report of the Sector InØuiry into the 
Ğood Retail Sector, 1E.
assortments and of the services offered by the undertak-
ings participating to the buying alliance, thus dampening 
competition.171 
18.  In analysing these agreements the competition 
authorities had departed from a strict application of 
the concept of dominance and adopted a broad under-
standing of market distortions. Bargaining power does 
not necessarily depend on the market share owned by a 
specific firm in the relevant market, neither on the level of 
concentration. If  a producer owns an important share of 
the market but, nonetheless, has to bargain with retailers 
disposing of valid alternatives to the negotiation, such as 
other substitutable brands or private label products, the 
bargaining power of that producer will most probably be 
limited. On the other hand, a concentrated local retail 
market, where a retailer holds an important share, may 
still be open to balanced negotiations, if  the producers 
have valid “outside alternatives,” both nationally and 
internationally, instead of negotiating with that retailer. 
For instance, the extent of the geographic presence at 
national and international level of the retail chain is 
able to considerably influence the negotiations, since its 
demand is difficult to be substituted and it is particularly 
relevant to reach economies of scale, possibly creating 
a situation of economic dependence of the supplier.172 
In France, the Autorité de la concurrence explored alle-
gations of abuse of superior bargaining power when 
examining three different cooperation agreements among 
the six most important French retailers (Système U/
Auchan, ITM/Casino, Carrefour/Cora).173 The Autorité 
pointed out that these agreements may fall within the 
scope of the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements, 
in view of the exchange of sensitive information between 
competitors and/or can be addressed according to abuse 
of economic dependence provisions. With regard to 
the latter, the Autorité found that the narrow approach 
adopted so far with regard to the definition and measure-
ment of economic dependence led to under-enforcement 
of these provisions and called for “an amendment to the 
procedure aimed at establishing the existence of abuses of 
economic dependency in order to make it more effective.”174
3. Abuse of economic 
dependence provisions
19.  Competition authorities also focus on the imple-
mentation of specific provisions on abuse of economic 
dependence, which may emerge in various situations. 
In the first scenario, two firms bargain the contract in 
power parity and in a competitive market, but nonethe-
less the investments made by one of them put this firm 
171 Case I7Ď8 Centrale Italiana S.c. a r.l. 
172 Italian Competition Ėuthority, ÌarÔet Investigation in the Retail Sector, 212.
17Ċ ĖutoritŮ de la concurrence, Opinion Concerning the Joint Purchasing 
Ėgreements in the Ğood Retail Sector.
17Ç ĖutoritŮ de la concurrence, Press ReleaseÈ Opinion 15ǼĖǼ0Ď of Ċ1 Ìarch 
2015 Concerning the Joint Purchasing Ėgreements in the Ğood Retail Sector, 7, 
available at httpÈCCwww.autoritedelaconcurrence.frCpdfCavisC15a0Ď.pdf, Ce
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Concurrences N° 1-2016 I On-Topic I Competition law and policy and the food value chain 31
into a situation of economic dependence, exposing it to 
hold-up from its business partner. In the second scenario, 
the economic dependence may result from market condi-
tions pre-existing to the stipulation of the contract, 
which forced one of the parties to accept the terms 
imposed by the other party and to undertake specific 
investments. With regard to its causes, the situation of 
economic dependence may derive from the absence of 
“outside options” for one of the business parties, or 
from high switching costs.175 The  food market presents 
plenty of opportunities for hold-up and anticompetitive 
conduct engendered by situations of economic depend-
ence.176 Farmers generally undertake specialized capital 
investments to provide the products at the local and inter-
national standards, under contractual arrangement with 
buyers. In particular, in markets of perishable products 
with few buyers, this contractual relationship easily turns 
into an economic dependence of the farmer to the buyer. 
Moreover, the particular conditions of the market of 
perishable products may be the cause of hold-up due 
to lack of alternatives for logistic reasons. Indeed, some 
products, such as chicken or sugar beets, have to be 
marketed locally, as they cannot be shipped far without 
losing much of their value. Processors and local buyers 
can therefore use this opportunity to impose low prices 
on farmers or non-favourable conditions. 
20.  Focusing on the relations between supplier and 
buyer, the Italian competition authority identifies four 
broad categories of economic dependence: i) depend-
ence on assortment of the retailer, typically linked to 
branded products, which defines the lack of alternatives 
to a particular product or group of products; ii) depend-
ence for shortage of supply sources, where the economic 
dependence originates from a situation of temporary lack 
of the specific product on the market; iii) dependence of 
the supplier, due to the fact that the supplier produces 
a significant share of its sales with a single buyer; iv) 
dependence on trade relations, in which the dependence 
originates from the significant asset-specific investments 
made by a contractor in order to fulfil its commitments 
and the difficulty to redeploy those investments for other 
purposes.177 
21. The French authority, instead, considers four different 
criteria for determining a situation of economic depend-
ence: i) the importance of the share of revenue generated 
by that supplier with the distributor; ii) the importance 
of the distributor in the marketing of the products 
concerned; iii) the absence of deliberate choice of 
supplier to concentrate its sales from the distributor; iv) 
the absence of alternative solutions supplier.178 However, 
both authorities conclude that this situation of economic 
dependence often gives rise to opportunistic hold-ups 
175 Italian Competition Ėuthority, ÌarÔet Investigation in the Retail Sector, 200.
17Ď J. Ì. ÌacGonald and P. Ħorb, Ėgricultural Contracting ĮpdateÈ Contracts 
in 2008 (2011) EIĘǼ72. Į.S. Gept. of Ėgriculture, Econ. Res. Serv. Economic 
Information Bulletin Ío. 72.
177 Italian Competition Ėuthority, ÌarÔet Investigation in the Retail Sector, 201.
178 ĖutoritŮ de la concurrence, Opinion Concerning the Joint Purchasing 
Ėgreements in the Ğood Retail Sector, 72.
from the party enjoying superior bargaining position. In 
particular, these authorities observe that often retailers 
request contract modifications or additions to dependent 
suppliers, threatening to delist the supplier’s product or 
to impose other forms of retaliation.179 
22. In its sector inquiry, the ICA observed that the 67% 
of the respondent suppliers reported requests of modi-
fications or additions to the supply contracts during 
their executions.180 In several cases, the request of the 
retailer to modify or add contract terms also regarded 
discount terms and expenditures, which were already 
been negotiated, having therefore a retroactive effect.181 
From the sample adopted, the authority stressed that 
the 74% of the respondents who refused to modify the 
contract accordingly to the retailer’s request, reported 
having suffered retaliation, either by delisting (62% of 
respondents), or by “clear and unjustified worsening of 
contract terms for the following procurement period”182 
(59% of respondents), or by adoption of both delisting 
and worsening of contract terms (47% of respondents). 
Moreover, according to this study, framework procure-
ment contracts are often stipulated after the start of the 
supply period,183 and the following contracts detailing 
the procurement agreement are almost always nego-
tiated during the supply period,184 leaving therefore 
ample margin for the integration of the contract by the 
dominant party. These findings seem to support those 
studies claiming that the adoption of incomplete agree-
ments (such as framework contracts), which parties detail 
during the execution, exposes the economic dependent 
undertaking to opportunistic hold-ups.185
17E ĖutoritŮ de la concurrence, Opinion Concerning the Joint Purchasing 
Ėgreements in the Ğood Retail Sector, 81É Italian Competition Ėuthority, ÌarÔet 
Investigation in the Retail Sector, 200.
180 Italian Competition Ėuthority, ÌarÔet Investigation in the Retail Sector, 
1ĎĊ. In detail, the respondents replied that this coercive modification of the 
contract happensÈ for the Ç5Ã ´sometimes,µ for the 18Ã ´oftenµ, and for the 
ÇÃ ´always.µ 
181 In this regard, the ICĖ points out that ´ LiĽt is particularly interesting to note that 
the maÓority of respondents (7ÇÃ) perceive, always or sometimes, these reØuests 
for unilateral modification of contract terms as binding for the supplier, which is 
eŔposed in the event of reÓection, to specific retaliation, such as ‘delisting’ (that 
is, the eŔclusion from the list of suppliers), total or only for some products, or an 
unÓustified worsening of the conditions for the following procurement periodµ 
(our translation). The ICĖ, therefore, acÔnowledges that 20Ã of respondents 
stated that they accept the reØuests ´always,µ Ċ7Ã ´often,µ Ċ8Ã said they accept 
them ´sometimes,µ and only 5Ã said they accept them ´never,µ at 1ĎĊ. 
182 These procurement contracts were generally annual and subÓect to 
renegotiation every year.
18Ċ In their sample, the Ċ5Ã of respondents always negotiate the frameworÔ 
agreement before the start of the supply period, the 1EÃ declared that this 
happens ´often,µ and the Ç5Ã admitted that this happens only ´sometimesµÉ see 
Italian Competition Ėuthority, ÌarÔet Investigation in the Retail Sector, 1Ď2.
18Ç Italian Competition Ėuthority, ÌarÔet Investigation in the Retail Sector, 1ĎĊ.
185 O. E Jilliamson, TransactionǼCost EconomicsÈ The Governance of 
Contractual Relations (1E7E) Journal of law and economics 2ĊĊÉ Ę. Ħlein, R. G. 
Crawford and Ė. Ė. Ėlchian, Vertical Integration, Ėppropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process (1E78) Journal of law and economics 2E7. 
Ęased on this theory, Ħlein, Crawford and Ėlchian designed an economic model 
eŔplaining that the intention of an opportunistic behaviour does not necessarily 
preeŔist to the formation of the contract, as it may also result from an assetǼ
specific investment of the business partner. Ce
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Ċ2 Concurrences N° 1-2016 I On-Topic I Competition law and policy and the food value chain
23.  In 2011, the Spanish National Commission for 
Competition (now “CNMC”), published a report on 
the relations between manufacturers and retailers in the 
food sector, with the aim to describe the status quo of 
the relations between retailers and suppliers and analyse 
the impact on competition of the alleged bargaining 
power of large distributors.186 The CNC found that 
the contracts linking suppliers with retail chains were 
occasionally left incomplete as for the consideration 
required, thus producing uncertainty, inefficient transfer 
of risk on the suppliers and a reduction of intra-brand 
competition.187
4. Mergers and effects-based 
analyses
24. The criterion of a “significant impediment of effective 
competition” in merger control also offers some flexi-
bility in order to assess unilateral effects that may be 
provoked by superior bargaining power. In the Edeka 
case, concerning the proposed acquisition of Kaiser’s 
Tengelmann by Edeka, the Bundeskartellamt observed 
that although the target company had low market shares 
at the national level, in some districts, it was the strongest 
and closest competitor of the two major groups, Edeka 
and Rewe.188 For this reason, the acquisition of Kaiser 
by Edeka would have created a significant impediment 
to effective competition (“SIEC”), because it would 
have significantly lessened the competitive pressure on 
Edeka in those markets where also Kaiser was present. 
Although it only accounted for 2-5% of the procurement 
market, Kaiser was found to be the only real alternative 
to Edeka and Rewe. 
18Ď Comision Íacional de la Competencia, Report on the Relations between 
Ìanufacturers and Retailers in the Ğood Sector, available atÈ httpÈCCwww.
cncompetencia.esCInicioCInformesCInformesyEstudiossectorialesCtabidC228C
Gefault.aspŔ.
187 OECG, Iatin Ėmerican Competition Ğorum, Competition Issues in the 
Groceries SectorÈ Ğocus on Conduct ² Contribution from Spain, Ċ, available at 
httpÈCCwww.oecd.orgCofficialdocumentsCpublicdisplaydocumentpdfCĒcoteĚGĖĞC
COÌPCIĖCĞ(2015)5ÄdocIanguageĚEn,. In the waÔe of the CÍC’s 
recommendations, the Spanish Parliament approved the Iaw 12C201Ċ on 
measures to improve the functioning of the food supply chain (ICĖ), with the 
threefold aim to detail the conditions and characteristics of contracts between 
retailers and suppliers, lay down a ´blacÔ listµ of prohibited ´abusiveµ practices, 
and empower the newly created Ğood Industry Information and Control Ėgency 
(ĖICĖ) to fine undertaÔings that fail to comply with these reØuirements. The 
Spanish Competition authority is highly critical of this new system where its 
competence overlaps in some cases with that of the Ìinistry responsible in the 
specific sector and with the new competences of the ĖICĖ, alleging that this has 
created a futile duplication of norms and institutions.
188 ĘundesÔartellamt, Case Ę2ǼEĎC1Ç Edeka/Kaiser’s Tengelmann, 
available at httpÈCCwww.bundesÔartellamt.deCSharedGocsC
EntscheidungCGECEntscheidungenCĞusionsÔontrolleC2015CĘ2ǼEĎǼ1Ç.
pdfĒŁŁblobĚpublicationĞileÄvĚĊ.
25. The SIEC test does not require market dominance, 
thus allowing the authority to impede a merger also in 
cases of non-coordinated or unilateral effects resulting 
from the dissolution of an important competitor. 
These  effects have to be evaluated for both the down-
stream and the upstream markets. With particular 
reference to the procurement sector, the U.K. Competi-
tion Commission considered that the further imbalance 
of the bargaining positions created by the merger may 
lower the “levels of investment in new products or manu-
facturing techniques” and produce “adverse effects on 
product innovation and diversity.”189 Moreover, in more 
than one occasion, the EU Commission has warned 
against the possible anticompetitive effects that superior 
buyer power may create in the downstream sector, due to 
the discounts that the new merged entity is able to obtain 
to the detriment of competitors.190
26.  European antitrust authorities have engaged with 
several other potentially anticompetitive effects following 
an abuse of superior bargaining power, such as “waterbed 
effects” or “spiraling effects,”191 or the foreclosure and 
collusive effects caused by category management192 or 
by slotting allowances.193 The recent study commis-
sioned by the European Commission on The Economic 
Impact of Modern Retail also raises the possibility that 
retail concentration at local level may produce negative 
aggregate dynamic effects, through the reduction of the 
incentives of suppliers to innovate.194
27. In conclusion, distortion of negotiations via abuse of 
superior bargaining position may happen at any node of 
the value chain and may take different forms. The NCAs 
have started to analyse how and to what extent superior 
bargaining power can distort competition and to develop 
tools and methods for its measurement.
18E ĮĦ Competition Comm, Safeway plc InØuiry, 200Ċ,  1.22(d).
1E0 See, for instance, EC Commission, Carrefour/Promodes, COÌP ÌC1Ď8Ç7, 
2 Gecember 1EEE; Kesko/Tuko IVCÌ.78Ç20 Íovember 1EEĎ.
1E1 Ęoth analysed by the ĘundesÔartellamt Ğood Retail Sector InØuiry, 25É 
ĖutoritŮ de la concurrence, Opinion Concerning the Joint Purchasing 
Ėgreements in the Ğood Retail Sector, 5Ď. The ´waterbed effectsµ may result 
from a merger downstream which leads to marginal costs reductions and lower 
input prices for the merged entity, which sees its output rising, while at the same 
time raising the input prices of the merged entity’s competitors, leading to an 
adverse effect on final consumers. On the ´waterbed effects,” see, R. Inderst 
and T. Valletti, Ęuyer Power and the ´Jaterbed Effectµ (2011) 5E(1) Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 1Ǽ20É P. Gobson and R. Inderst, Gifferential Ęuyer Power 
and the Jaterbed EffectÈ Go Strong Ęuyers Ęenefit or Harm ConsumersĒ (2007) 
28(7) ECLR, ĊEĊǼÇ00É Ė. ÌaÓumdar, Jaterbed Effects and Ęuying Ìergers, 
CCP Working Paper 05Ǽ7 (2007).
1E2 Ğinnish competition authority, Study on Trade in Groceries, 2Ď.
1EĊ Italian Competition Ėuthority, ÌarÔet Investigation in the Retail Sector, 1ĊĊ.
1EÇ European Commission, GG COÌP, The Economic Impact of Ìodern Retail 
on Choice and Innovation in the EĮ Ğood Sector, (201Ç), available at httpÈCC
ec.europa.euCcompetitionCpublicationsCĦG021ÇE55EÍÍ.pdf, ĊĎ. However, 
the study also found that ´a large imbalance away from suppliers and towards 
modern retailers was generally found to be associated with more innovation, 
reflecting in particular the finding that greater supplier concentration was 
associated with less innovation,µ although it was also noted that the Ìember 
States in the sample did not include those with the highest level of national 
retailer concentration. The methodology of measuring the level of innovation 
followed in this study was also Øuite narrow as innovation essentially referred to 
the introduction of ´ new EAN productsµ (EĖÍ being European Ėrticle Íumber). Ce
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IV. A different kind 
of competition law?
28.  The atomistic nature of agricultural markets and 
the consolidation of the processing and the retailing 
part of the food value chain have brought attention to 
the issue of bargaining power in agricultural markets. 
As the following table shows, the agricultural/produc-
tion segment of the chain is populated by a significant 
number of economic actors, their size varying generally 
from smallholders to agroholdings. 
29.  Despite the increasing trend to larger agricultural 
exploitations,195 farmers are generally small economic 
actors that face considerable pressure from the 
concentrated upstream segment of factors of production 
(i.e. seed companies, fertilizers, herbicides) and the 
concentrated retail level, thus observing their share of 
the total surplus value diminishing. A classic response 
to the exercise of such superior selling power upstream, 
and bargaining power downstream, is the creation of 
agricultural cooperatives, or other farmers’ organizations, 
as it is thought that such pooling of resources will enable 
farmers to preserve, or even gain, a larger share of the total 
surplus of the value chain.196 Agricultural cooperatives 
 
1E5 Ęoston Consulting Group, Crop Ğarming 20Ċ0 ² The Reinvention of the Sector 
(Ėpril 2015), available at httpsÈCCwww.bcgperspectives.comCcontentCarticlesC 
processǼindustriesǼinnovationǼcropǼfarmingǼ20Ċ0ǼreinventionǼsector.
1EĎ These can be stateǼrun institutions, such as the Ghana Cocoa Ęoard. One may 
also note the emergence of international traders that serve as intermediaries 
between farmers and retailers. See J. Iee, G. Gereffi and J. Ęeauvais, 
Global value chains and agrifood standardsÈ Challenges and possibilities for 
smallholders in developing countries, (2012) 10E (Ċ1) Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Science 12Ċ2ĎǼ12ĊĊ1, 12Ċ28.
* Source: KPMG International, The agricultural and food value chain: Entering a new era of cooperation (2013), 5.
Table 2. Key profitability metrics for the agribusiness value chain*
Sector Input Farmers Traders Food companies Retailers
Sales:  
US$bn (approx.) 400 3,000 1,000 3,500 5,400
Number of players 100s 450 million Tens Thousands Millions
EBIT % 15% Variable 2–5% 10–20% 5%
R&D % sales
<1% (fertilizers) –
10% (seeds)
0% <1% 1–2% <1%
R&D spend:  
US$bn 10 – Low 8 Low
Composition/ 
Sub-sectors
•	Seed
•	 Fertilizer
•	 Crop protection
•	 Machinery
•	Animal health 
and nutrition
•	Crop insurance
•	 Food ingredients
•	 Grains
•	  Fruit and 
vegetables
•	 Meat
•	 Dairy
•	 Handling
•	  Primary  
processing
•	  Secondary 
processing
•	 Bakery
•	 Meat
•	 Dairy
•	 Snacks
•	 Ready meals
•	 Beverages
•	 Multiples
•	 Discounters
•	 Wholesalers
•	 Independents
Range
R&D-based 
majors to 
generic 
manufacturers
Smallholders to 
agroholdings
Global agribusi-
nesses  
to local middlemen
SMEs to 
multina-
tionals
Corner 
shops to 
hypermarkets
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benefit from antitrust immunity in the United States,197 
and have generally been assessed positively under 
Article 101 TFEU.198 However, in addition to the quite 
liberal antitrust approach followed in this area, the EU 
has instituted specific competition law derogations for 
producer organizations, on the basis of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) provisions of the EU Treaties 
and related secondary legislation.199 According to 
Article 42 TFEU, the EU legislator determines the extent 
of the application of competition rules to the agricultural 
sector, taking into account the objectives of the CAP set 
out in Article 39 TFEU.200 These aims take precedence 
over the objectives pursued by EU competition law.201 
Article 206 of the CMO Regulation declares Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU applicable to the production and trace 
in agricultural products, but the CMO Regulation 
also provides a general derogation for certain types 
of agreements from the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU 
(although not from Article 102 TFEU) if  these collusive 
practices are necessary for the attainment of the CAP 
objectives.202 This derogation also applies to all POs and 
APOs entering into agreements for the production or 
sale of agricultural products or the use of joint facilities 
for the storage, treatment or processing of agricultural 
products, although it does not apply to collusive 
practices involving an obligation to charge an identical 
price excluding competition. In addition to the general 
derogation, there are specific additional derogations 
from which benefit the sectors of olive oil, beef and veal 
and arable crops, as set out by the CMO Regulation and 
some impending Commission Guidelines.203 According 
to the Commission, “[t]he purpose of the Derogation is 
to strengthen the bargaining power of producers in the 
sectors concerned vis-à-vis downstream operators in order 
1E7 See the CapperǼVolstead Ėct, 7 Į.S.C.  2E1Ǽ2E2. This immunity is narrowly 
construed by the ĮS courts. Ğor a recent commentary, C. Ė. Varney, The CapperǼ
Volstead Ėct, Ėgricultural Cooperatives and Ėntitrust Immunity, (Gecember 
2010) The Antitrust Source, 1ǼE.
1E8 The CJEĮ held that constituting cooperatives does not itself constitute an antiǼ
competitive conduct, however agricultural cooperatives do not fall outside the 
scope of Ėrticle 101(1) TĞEĮ, as they may inÁuence the trading conduct of their 
members so as to restrict competition in the marÔetÈ Case CǼĊEECEĊ, H. G. Oude 
Luttikhuis and others v. Verenigde Coöperatieve Melkindustrie Coberco, L1EE5Ľ 
ECR IǼ0Ç515,  10Ǽ1Ď. 
1EE Ėrticles 1ĎE, 170 and 171 of Regulation Ío 1Ċ08C201Ċ of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a Common Organisation of the 
ÌarÔets in agricultural products, L201ĊĽ OJ IĊÇ7CĎ71 (hereinafter CÌO 
Regulation) allowing Producer OrganiŖations (POs) and Ėssociations of 
Producer Organisations (ĖPOs) to negotiate, on behalf of their members, 
contracts for the supply of the products concerned under a number of conditionsĒ
200 These are ´(i) to increase agricultural productivity («) and the optimum 
utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labourÉ (ii) thus to ensure 
a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular by 
increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agricultureÉ (iii) to 
stabilise marÔetsÉ (iv) to assure the availability of suppliesÉ and (v) to ensure that 
suppliers reach consumers at reasonable prices.µ
201 Case 1ĊEC7E, Maizena GmbH v. Council, L1E80Ľ ECR ĊĊEĊ,  2ĊÉ 
Case CǼ280CEĊ, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council, L1EEÇĽ ECR IǼÇE7Ċ, 
 Ď1.
202 See Ėrticles 207 to 210 of the CÌO Regulation.
20Ċ Ėrticles 1ĎE, 170 and 171 of the CÌO RegulationÉ Graft Commission Íotice, 
Guidelines on the Ėpplication of the Specific Rules Set out in Ėrticles 1ĎE, 170 
and 181 of the CÌO Regulation for the olive oil, beef and veal and arable crops 
sectors, (2015), available at httpÈCCec.europa.euCcompetitionCconsultationsC2015Ł 
cmoŁregulationCdraftŁguidelinesÃ20Łen.pdf. 
to ensure a fair standard of living for the producers and 
a viable development of production (…) The Derogation’s 
purpose is to be achieved through POs effectively 
concentrating supply and placing products on the market 
and, as a consequence, negotiating supply contracts on 
behalf of their members.”204 The Derogation is subject 
to a number of conditions, including consideration of 
how the practice contributes to the objectives of the PO, 
a “significant efficiency test,” notification obligations 
and a production cap, which is 15% of the total national 
production of each product covered by the contractual 
negotiations for the sectors of beef and veal and of arable 
crops and less than 20% of the relevant market in the 
sector of olive oil.205 As indicated above, this new kind of 
competition rules is justified by the significant unbalance 
of bargaining power between farmers and retailers. 
30. Other public-interest oriented competition law regimes 
may provide further illustrations of the increasing impor-
tance of distributive concerns and bargaining power in 
competition law enforcement, thus building the case for 
adopting a GVC framework. 
31.  The public interest test in South African merger 
control has provided South African competition author-
ities the opportunity to examine bargaining power and 
its effects on local suppliers in the Walmart-Massmart 
merger. Following the announcement of Walmart’s 
interest to acquire a controlling share in Massmart, the 
South African Competition Commission examined and 
unconditionally cleared the merger between the world’s 
largest retailer and one of South Africa’s leading retail 
chains, finding that it was not likely to lead to a substan-
tial prevention or lessening of competition. Massmart is 
a wholesaler and retailer of groceries, liquors and general 
merchandise and operates through 10 subsidiaries 
scattered on the African continent. On the basis of the 
public interest provisions of the South African Compe-
tition Act,206 the labour unions seized the Commis-
sion, arguing that the clearing of the merger would have 
caused significant job losses for South African workers 
in the retail sector, in view of Walmart’s established 
value chain, which involved imports of foreign products. 
Consequently, the Commission revised its position, 
suggesting a conditional approval of the merger. 
20Ç Graft Commission Íotice, Guidelines on the Ėpplication of the Specific Rules 
Set out in Ėrticles 1ĎE, 170 and 181 of the CÌO Regulation for the olive oil, 
beef and veal and arable crops sectors, (2015),  Ċ8ǼĊE.
205 Ėccording to the Commission, if the negotiation by a PO on behalf of its 
members concerns supply in more Ìember States, the production volumes in 
each Ìember State should not eŔceed 15Ã of the national production for beef 
and veal and arable crops and of 20Ã of the relevant marÔet for olive oil.
20Ď Section 12Ė of the Competition Ėct Ío. 8EC1EE8 disposes that the Tribunal 
must ´determine whether a merger can or cannot be Óustified on substantial 
public interest grounds by assessing the factors set out in subsection (Ċ).µ This 
subsection (Ċ) limits the public interest consideration to four conditions related 
to the effect that the merger will have onÈ
 ² Ė particular industrial sector or industryÉ
 ² EmploymentÉ
 ² The ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitiveÉ and
 ² The ability of national industries to compete in international marÔets. Ce
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32. Both the Competition Tribunal207 and the Court of 
Appeal,208 found that the merger was not expected to 
result in a substantial lessening of competition. Walmart, 
indeed, was only indirectly present in South Africa 
through an exporter of fresh produce, International 
Produce Limited, which did not operate as a retailer. 
Moreover, Massmart had a market share of 25% in the 
South African retail sector, therefore raising no direct 
concerns about the existence of a substantial prevention 
or lessening of competition. Finally, on the basis of the 
economic evidence available, the Court agreed that the 
merger would have brought lower prices to consumers.
33. The Court was however concerned by the effects that 
the merger would have had on Massmart’s local suppliers, 
especially SMEs, which could have been substituted by 
Walmart’s international suppliers. The Court had thus 
to gauge between the positive effect of price reductions 
for consumers and the negative effect of possible job 
displacements in the local supply market. The Court 
acknowledged that Walmart operates a global value 
chain and that protecting domestic suppliers by prohib-
iting the merger would have been “futile.” However, the 
Court felt that it had to balance the positive price effects 
to consumers with a remedy that would take into consid-
eration the public-interest related condition laid down in 
Section 12A. For this reason, it ordered the establishment 
of a supplier development fund by Massmart, aiming at 
minimizing “the risks to micro, small and medium sized 
producers of South African products caused or which 
may be caused by Massmart’s merger with Wal-Mart.”209 
The fund would provide an incentive to Massmart to 
purchase products from South African producers, thus 
guaranteeing the access of local suppliers to Walmart’s 
supply chain in South Africa and eventually to its global 
network. Although the SA Court has not engaged 
directly with the concept of GVC, this has undoubtedly 
exercised some influence on the design of the remedy/
merger conditions in this case.
207 Jalmart Stores Inc and Ìassmart Holdings Iimited (2011) 7ĊCIÌCÍov10.
208 SĖCCĖJĮ and Ìassmart Holdings Iimited (2012) 110CCĖCCJun11.
20E SĖCCĖJĮ and Ìassmart Holdings Iimited (2012) 110CCĖCCJun11.
34.  Competition authorities may also be entrusted 
specific duties with regard to the regulation of superior 
bargaining power in the food sector. For instance, in Italy, 
the legislator has intervened through two different instru-
ments, the traditional abuse of economic dependence 
laws and some new rules on the regulation of the contrac-
tual relationships between agricultural producers and 
business buyers when it is not possible to use the tradi-
tional tools of the prohibition of anticompetitive agree-
ments and abuse of a dominant position. Article 62.8 of 
the law 27/2012 provides the Italian Antitrust Authority 
(ICA) the power to punish a conduct resulting in “an 
unwarranted exercise of bargaining power on the demand 
side at the expense of suppliers.”210 Therefore, in addition 
to its power to intervene in cases of abuses of dominant 
position, the ICA can now intervene in commer-
cial relationships of a vertical nature in the agro-food 
industry, even in the absence of a dominant position, 
provided that the contract produces an appreciable 
adverse effect on the market. Article 62.8, prohibits the 
stronger contracting party from imposing unfair condi-
tions on the counterparty. On July 9, 2015, the ICA 
concluded the first procedure based on the application of 
Article 62.8, against the retailer Eurospin, for allegedly 
imposing upon its suppliers the half-yearly payment of 
two unjustifiably large sums which did not correspond 
to any service provided to them by the group.211 The 
ICA concluded, however, that the business conduct put 
in place by Eurospin did not constitute an infringement 
of Article 62.8. The contested contractual terms were 
indeed fairly negotiated and not imposed. Moreover, the 
ICA observed that the relative costs were proportioned to 
the service offered by Eurospin. n
210 ICĖ, ĖgriǼfoodstuffsÈ according to the Ėntitrust, the marÔet power of the 
organiŖed mass distribution getting stronger, conÁicting relationships with 
suppliers and uncertain effects on consumers, ICÇĊ, available at httpÈCCwww.
agcm.itCenCnewsroomCpressǼreleasesC2101ǼicÇĊǼagriǼfoodstuffsǼaccordingǼtoǼ
theǼantitrustǼtheǼmarÔetǼpowerǼofǼtheǼorganiŖedǼmassǼdistributionǼgettingǼ
strongerǼconflictingǼrelationshipsǼwithǼsuppliersǼandǼuncertainǼeffectsǼonǼ
consumers.html.
211 Italian Competition Ėuthority Eurospin Italia S.p.Ė. decision Ío. 25551 of 
E July 2015. Ce
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